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Abstract 
We model the impact of local supply constraints on local house prices in a setting in which 
households with idiosyncratic tastes sort endogenously over heterogeneous locations. We test the 
theoretical prediction that house prices respond more strongly to changes in local earnings in 
places with tight supply constraints using a unique panel dataset of 353 local planning authorities 
in England ranging from 1974 to 2008. Exploiting exogenous variation from a policy reform, 
vote shares and historical density to identify the endogenous constraints-measures, we find that: i) 
Regulatory constraints have a substantive positive impact on the house price-earnings elasticity; 
ii) The effect of constraints due to scarcity of developable land is largely confined to highly
urbanised areas; iii) Uneven topography has a quantitatively less meaningful impact; iv) The 
effects of supply constraints are greater during boom than bust periods; and v) Our findings are 
robust to using a labour demand shock measure as demand shifter. 
JEL Classifications: G12, R11, R21, R31, R52 
Keywords:  House prices, housing supply, supply constraints, land use regulation 
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1. Introduction
House values in England – particularly in London and the South East of the country – are 
amongst the highest in the world.1 The average price of a single detached freehold house in 
Kensington and Chelsea in 2008 – the last year of our sample period – was £4.3M (8.6M in 
2008 US dollars). Of course, the royal borough of Kensington and Chelsea is extraordinary in 
many respects. However, house values were also extremely high in less exceptional places. 
The mean price of an equivalent house in Richmond, a nice ‘greenish’ London suburb was 
£1.2M; in the rather distressed but maybe transforming London borough of Hackney it still 
fetched £767k. Perhaps most astonishingly, even in rural places (e.g., Cotswold in the West of 
England; £470k) and in struggling cities (e.g., Birmingham in the West Midlands; £353k) 
house prices are very high by international standards.2 These statistics are even more 
astounding when housing size is taken into account. A new-build house is 38 percent smaller 
in the UK than in densely populated Germany and 40 percent smaller than in the even more 
densely populated Netherlands (Statistics Sweden, 2005). 
Real house prices – but not real incomes – have grown faster in the UK over the last 40 years 
than in any other OECD country.3 As a consequence of this, a genuine ‘housing affordability 
crisis’ has been developing. Young households are particularly strongly affected; they 
increasingly struggle to get their feet on the owner-occupied housing ladder. Although 
existing homeowners nominally benefit from higher asset prices, they are also in some sense 
adversely affected. They cannot realise the ‘gains’ unless they downsize housing 
consumption, give up owner-occupation and rent instead or sell their houses and move 
abroad.4 In the interim high house prices force them to live in comparably cramped spaces. 
Price volatility is similarly extraordinary. During the last full real estate cycle real house 
values in the UK as a whole first rose by 83 percent during the upswing of the 1980s; they 
subsequently declined by 38 percent during the downturn of the first half of the 1990s. This 
swing is substantially larger than that of the most volatile metro area in the US during the 
same cycle period: real values in Los Angeles rose by 67 percent and declined by 33 percent.5  
1 According to a comprehensive country comparison of the buying price per square metre for residential 
properties in 97 countries, provided by Globalpropertyguide.com (http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/most-
expensive-cities; last accessed: 28 March 2013), the UK (London) is ranked second, only topped by the tiny city-
state of Monaco, a famous tax heaven with no income tax. Ignoring this ‘special case’, the UK (London) tops the 
world ranking ahead of Hong Kong, France (Paris), Russia (Moscow), Singapore, Switzerland (Geneva), Japan 
(Tokyo) and the United States (New York). 
2 Average prices are based on actual transaction prices – provided by the Land Registry – of all single detached 
freehold houses sold during 2008. 
3 Measured between 1971q1 and 2011q1 (OECD Economic Outlook database, 2011). Nationwide house price 
data suggests that prices have grown faster in England since 1973q4 than in any other UK country. 
4 In principle homeowners could extract home equity through refinancing. This practice however is not common 
in England for two reasons. First, refinancing typically triggers considerable penalties and fees. Second, unlike 
for example in the US, mortgage financing is not associated with tax advantages in England. Hence, home equity 
extraction implies high opportunity costs in the form of additional interest payments.  
5 The calculations for the UK are based on the Nationwide house price index. The nominal index is deflated by 
the retail price index that excludes mortgage interest payments in order to obtain a real price index. The troughs 
of the cycle were in 1982 and 1995, the peak was in 1989. The figures for LA are taken from Glaeser et al. 
(2008) who investigate the cyclical behaviour of 79 metro areas in the US. Real prices in LA rose between 1984 
and 1989 and declined between 1990 and 1994. One caveat with this comparison is that the two price index 
series were derived from different methodologies. The Nationwide index is based on a hedonic model, whereas 
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In this paper we set out to explore the causal impact of various types of long-run supply 
constraints on house prices in England. Our main focus is on how regulatory constraints 
affect the sensitivity of house prices to changes in demand. The proposition that the English 
planning system impacts house prices is not far-fetched. The planning system is widely 
viewed as inflexible. Historically, it ignored market signals and has failed adequately to cope 
with changing socio-economic conditions. This rigid supply regime has been suggested – but 
not tested – to be an important cause of England’s excessively high level and volatility of 
house prices.  
An alternative proposition is that the high house prices are driven – at least in part – by strong 
demand for housing in conjunction with physical (or geographical) constraints. The scarcity 
of developable land and uneven topography (steep slopes) may both limit the long-run 
response of housing supply to demand induced price changes: whereas scarcity related 
constraints may be binding in highly developed locations such as the Greater London Area, 
slope related constraints may affect prices in rugged areas in the North and West of England. 
In this paper we carefully control for such physical supply constraints and disentangle and 
identify the separate impacts of the different types of constraints.  
To do so, we compile a panel dataset that combines house price and earnings information – 
spanning 35 years and covering 353 English Local Planning Authorities (LPAs)6 – with rich 
and direct information on regulatory and physical supply constraints for these locations. 
Exploiting this data and using exogenous variation from a policy reform, vote shares and 
historical density to identify the causal effects of the otherwise endogenous constraints-
measures, we find that local regulatory constraints have a substantive positive impact on the 
response of local house prices to changes in local earnings. These results are robust to using a 
labour demand shock measure, derived from the local industry composition in 1971 and 
national employment growth in the various industries, instead of earnings. According to our 
baseline estimate, house prices in England would have risen by about 100 percent less, in real 
terms, from 1974 to 2008 (from £79k to £147k instead of to £226k) if, hypothetically, all 
regulatory constraints were removed.7 Our estimates thus imply that house prices would have 
been about 35 percent lower (£147k instead of £226k) in 2008 absent of regulatory 
constraints. More pragmatically: had the South East, the most regulated English region, the 
regulatory restrictiveness of the North East, still highly regulated in an international context, 
house prices in the South East would have been roughly 25 percent lower in 2008. The effect 
of constraints due to local scarcity of developable land is largely confined to highly urbanised 
areas. The local impact of uneven topography is quantitatively less important. Hypothetically 
removing both types of physical supply constraints, again according to our baseline estimate, 
the index series for LA is derived from a repeat-sales price index. Given that the hedonic index for the UK is 
based on a well specified model and a large sample and the underlying sample for the LA housing market is also 
large, the potential biases are likely small (see Case et al., 1991). Hansen (2009) also finds that the two 
methodologies yield similar price changes if the underlying samples are sufficiently large. 
6 LPAs are the local authorities or councils that are legally responsible for the execution of planning policy and 
hence, they are the natural geographical unit for our analysis of the impact of planning policy on house prices. 
The average number of households in a LPA in our sample is 53158, based on the 1991 Census. LPAs are thus 
larger than the typical American municipality but smaller than the typical metropolitan area. 
7 This translates into an annual real house price growth rate differential of 1.3 percent (1.8 percent versus 3.1 
percent). 
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would have reduced house prices in 2008 by 15 percent.8 The effects of the various supply 
constraints on the price earnings elasticity are greater during boom than bust periods. 
Our investigation makes several novel contributions with respect to earlier work in the 
literature. On the theoretical side, we model the effect of local supply constraints on local 
house prices in a setting in which households with idiosyncratic tastes sort endogenously over 
heterogeneous locations. While the literature on household sorting in a spatial equilibrium 
framework is well established (see Anderson et al., 1992; Bayer et al., 2007, for example) 
there are few studies that consider spatial variation in supply constraints in such a setting 
(Aura and Davidoff, 2008; Glaeser et al., 2005a; Gyourko et al., 2013; Hilber and Robert-
Nicoud, 2013). The novel contribution of our theoretical framework relative to this literature 
is that we derive a formal prediction with respect to the impact of local supply constraints on 
the response of local house prices to local demand shocks. It provides a concise yet rigorous 
justification for our empirical model and, more generally, for the proposition that the response 
of local house prices to local demand shocks depends on local supply constraints.9 
On the empirical side, our study makes three novel contributions. First, we use a unique new 
dataset that includes direct information on actual planning decisions to measure regulatory 
restrictiveness. This sets our paper apart from the US literature, which relies on either survey 
data (e.g., Saiz, 2010) or shadow prices (e.g., Glaeser et al., 2005b). Second, we carefully 
disentangle the separate causal effect of regulatory constraints, physical constraints (degree of 
development) and topography on local house prices. The larger part of the empirical literature 
on the impact of land use regulation does not address the endogeneity of this variable and fails 
to account for physical constraints, which are likely correlated with regulation. The most 
closely related paper to ours is Saiz (2010). Using data for the US, Saiz (2010) instruments for 
land use regulation and takes geographical constraints (steep-sloped terrain and the presence 
of water bodies) into account. Apart from our focus being on England, one contribution 
relative to Saiz (2010) is that we disentangle the effects of the share of developable land that 
is already developed and elevation, while carefully addressing the endogeneity of the share of 
developed land and of regulatory constraints. Third, our study is the first to quantify, in an 
econometrically rigorous way, the economic impact of local regulatory constraints imposed 
by the British planning system on the response of local house prices to changes in local 
earnings (or local labour demand shocks). It thus provides important insights into the current 
(heated) policy debate surrounding Britain’s housing affordability crisis. 
2. Background
Various studies suggest that the extraordinarily high real house price growth in the UK over 
the last 40 years and in particular since the mid-1990s may be linked to the British planning 
8 All these estimates understate the impact of the various supply constraints to the extent that they were already 
binding in 1974. Early work by Hall et al. (1973) indicates that the current form of the British planning system, 
dating back to 1947, may indeed have already imposed binding constraints as early as the beginning of the 
1970s. 
9 This proposition is not straightforward. The standard spatial equilibrium framework – the Rosen-Roback model 
of compensating differentials (Rosen, 1979; Roback, 1982) – implicitly assumes perfectly elastic local housing 
demand. In such a setting spatial differences in local supply constraints (or in the supply price elasticity) only 
affect the amount of new construction but not the degree to which local demand shocks are capitalized into 
house prices. See Hilber (2012) for further discussion. 
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system (e.g., Cheshire and Sheppard, 2002; Barker, 2004 and 2006; OECD, 2004; Evans and 
Hartwich, 2005). Cameron et al. (2006) investigate the proposition that regional house prices 
between 1972 and 2003 in Britain have deviated from fundamentals (‘bubble hypothesis’). 
They find no evidence suggesting a ‘bubble’, instead their results are consistent with lack of 
house building in conjunction with strong demand growth as a major driver of house price 
appreciation during their sample period, consistent with the main findings in this paper. 
A few recent studies investigate the economic impact of the British planning system 
empirically, including its effect on house prices. For example, Bramley (1998) explores the 
effect of various measures of planning restraint on various outcome measures including house 
prices in a cross-section of English locations. One important contribution of this study is that 
it provides an early discussion on (i) how planning constraints should be measured and (ii) 
endogeneity problems associated with different types of measures. Cheshire and Sheppard 
(2002) and Ball et al. (2009) convincingly illustrate the high gross and net costs of the 
planning system for a single LPA in England. Cheshire and Hilber (2008) find that the gross 
cost imposed by regulatory restrictions – measured as a ‘regulatory tax’ – varies substantially 
across British office markets and over time, with the highest cost being observed in the 
Greater London Area. The estimated regulatory tax for Westminster, perhaps one of the most 
regulated places in the world, exceeds 800% of marginal construction costs. The lowest costs 
are being observed in Newcastle; the estimated tax is negative during the mid/late 1980s. The 
time trend is positive in most markets, consistent with the proposition that land use regulation 
policies in England may have become more binding over time.  
Outside of the UK, research on the impact of land use regulation on house prices has mainly 
focused on the US. A number of recent studies document that land use regulation reduces the 
housing supply price elasticity (e.g., Harter-Dreiman, 2004; Green et al., 2005; Quigley and 
Raphael, 2005; Saiz, 2010) whilst raising price levels (e.g., Glaeser and Gyourko, 2003; 
Glaeser et al., 2005a,b; Quigley and Raphael, 2005; Saks, 2008). Particularly relevant to our 
study, Saks (2008) shows that metro areas with few barriers to construction experience more 
residential construction and smaller increases in house prices in response to an increase in 
housing demand. Glaeser et al. (2005a,b) conjecture that tight land use controls may be 
largely to blame for the exorbitant rise in housing prices in parts of the US during the late 
1990s and early 2000s. Glaeser et al. (2005b) uncover that the ‘regulatory tax’ exceeds 50 
percent of condominium prices in places such as Manhattan or San Francisco but is negligible 
in places such as Pittsburgh or Houston.  
Glaeser and Ward (2009), however, do not find a significant impact of local land use 
regulation on house prices across local municipalities in the Greater Boston area. They argue 
that since this area constitutes of many nearby and rather similar towns, households would not 
accept a regulation-induced rise in prices in one place, because they could easily substitute it 
for another nearby place. As a consequence, in their sample, local constraints on housing 
supply may only have an impact on prices at the level of the Greater Boston area. The same 
argument should not apply, however, to studies that consider locations that are less close 
substitutes such as metro areas in the US or, arguably, LPAs in England. Several theoretical 
models have been proposed that assume heterogeneity in tastes for locations inducing 
imperfect substitutability between locations (Glaeser et al., 2005a; Aura and Davidoff, 2008; 
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Gyourko et al., 2013; Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2013). In such models supply constraints 
may raise prices because they constrain the number of households so that the marginal 
household has a higher willingness to pay for residing in a particular place. We extend this 
literature by deriving a comparative static result on the impact of supply constraints on the 
response of local house prices to local earnings in this setting.  
A few studies suggest that physical supply constraints affect the supply price elasticity and 
that therefore demand shocks should have a stronger impact on house prices in places with 
more limited supply of developable land. Hilber and Mayer (2009) demonstrate that the more 
developed 50 percent of municipalities in Massachusetts (with comparably less open and 
developable land for new construction) have more inelastic supply of new housing and that in 
these places demand shocks are capitalised to a greater extent into house prices. (This finding 
also implies that the more and less developed places in Massachusetts are sufficiently 
imperfect substitutes to ensure a differential price response to demand shocks.) Saiz (2010) 
measures the amount of developable land based on the presence of water bodies and steep-
sloped terrain in the US, demonstrating that most metropolitan areas that are widely regarded 
as supply-inelastic are severely land-constrained by topography.  
Saiz (2010) also documents that topographical constraints correlate positively and strongly 
with regulatory barriers to development and that both types of constraints negatively affect 
the elasticity of housing supply. Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2013) provide a theoretical 
explanation and empirical evidence for the US consistent with their explanation for why more 
developed places tend to be more regulated. More desirable locations are more developed and 
hence owners of developed land will be relatively more politically influential than owners of 
undeveloped land. Land use constraints benefit the former group (via increasing property 
prices) but hurt the latter (via increasing development costs). Hence, as a consequence of 
political economy forces, more developed places will be more regulated. This theoretical 
insight has implications for our empirical work: local regulatory constraints may be 
endogenous to local land scarcity. It is thus important to control for both types of constraints 
and identify their causal effects using an IV approach. 
A few recent studies explore the impact of the supply side on house price volatility. Glaeser et 
al. (2008) illustrate that during boom phases house prices in the US grow much more strongly 
in metro areas with inelastic supply. They also report that the level of mean reversion during 
bust phases is enormous; however, the price elasticity and price declines are hardly correlated. 
The implication is that metro areas with more inelastic supply will have higher price volatility 
but this is, consistent with our findings for England, mainly driven by stronger price reactions 
during upswings. Paciorek (2013) documents a strong positive relationship at the city-level in 
the US between the volatility of house prices and the stringency of regulation of new housing 
supply. His estimates and simulations suggest that supply constraints increase volatility 
through two channels: (i) Regulation lowers the elasticity of new housing supply by 
increasing lags in the permit process and by adding to the cost of supplying new houses on the 
margin and (ii) geographic limitations on the area available for building houses lead to less 
investment on average relative to the existing housing stock, leaving less scope for the supply 
response to attenuate the effects of a demand shock.  
6 
3. Theoretical Framework
In this section, we develop a theoretical framework, in which households sort according to 
their idiosyncratic preferences for heterogeneous locations, and, in which house prices are 
determined such that, in a spatial equilibrium, no household has an incentive to move – i.e. all 
opportunities for ‘spatial arbitrage’ are exhausted. This focus on arbitrage between places is 
consistent with our empirical analysis in that we control for the impact of all aggregate 
(macroeconomic) shocks through year fixed effects and therefore identify the house price-
earnings elasticity on variation in housing demand and supply determinants between places.  
Places may differ in many aspects, such as proximity to the sea, landscape features, the 
availability of cultural facilities or the quality of local public schools, and there is no reason 
why households should all value these amenities in the same way. Furthermore, some of these 
amenities are arguably unique to specific places. No other place in England, for example, 
reproduces the White Cliffs of Dover or London’s choice of museums. Heterogeneity in 
preferences over places is likely reinforced by personal history. People may feel attached to 
the place where they grew up, because they acquired a taste for the regional culture or because 
they want to stay close to friends and family.  
In such a setting with idiosyncratic preferences for heterogeneous locations, in spatial 
equilibrium, the household on the margin of purchasing a house in a certain location will 
determine the price of access to its amenities. For unique amenities that are not available in a 
more or less continuously varying quality throughout the country, this price will depend on 
both the supply of housing with access to these amenities and on the distribution of 
preferences – see for instance Bayer et al. (2007) for a discussion. As housing supply in the 
location that offers this access expands, households enter with ever lower willingness to pay 
for the amenity and the amenity-induced house price premium falls accordingly. As we show 
formally below, the impact of local earnings shocks on local house prices then also depends 
on local housing supply conditions for essentially the same reason. A positive shock to local 
productivity, which increases the earnings a household can obtain in the boosted location, 
attracts new households, who bid up the price of housing until the marginal household is 
indifferent to living elsewhere. A place where housing is supplied more elastically will draw 
more households, so that the marginal household’s willingness to pay for its unique amenities 
is lower.  
Our particular focus is on demonstrating the impact of long-term supply constraints on the 
relationship between earnings and house prices in a setting as outlined above. We consider the 
impact of an exogenous change in local earnings, which may be driven for instance by a 
shock to an industry that is well represented in the local area. While earnings may also be 
influenced by local housing market conditions, our empirical analysis below verifies the 
robustness of our results to potential endogeneity of earnings by identifying on arguably 
exogenous labour demand shocks. Furthermore, we simplify the analysis by ignoring 
differences in labour participation and skills across households and by treating housing units 
as homogeneous.  
We consider one particular location (in our empirical setting e.g. an LPA or a Travel to Work 
Area, TTWA) that is small relative to the rest of the country. Let the country be inhabited by 
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H households, indexed by h. We assume that the utility V that household h derives from 
residing in the location is given by: 
( ) ( ), , ,V Y P A h Y P A hε= − + + , (1) 
in which Y denotes local earnings, P is the price of a unit of housing in the location and A 
captures local amenities that households value similarly or that are available throughout the 
country. Crucially, ε(h) is an idiosyncratic taste for the unique amenities of this specific 
location, which different households value differently. Alternatively, this term can be 
interpreted as representing attachment to the location through personal history, existing local 
social networks or other barriers to mobility, such as transaction taxes and other moving costs, 
that vary over households and affect a household’s willingness-to-pay to live in this specific 
location.10 We assume that households have to live in the location in order to earn Y, ignoring 
the possibility of commuting. We verify in the empirical analysis below that our results are 
not sensitive to this assumption; our findings hold at the geographical scale of TTWAs, which 
are designed to fully contain local labour markets and therefore encompass commutes.11  
Through a sorting process, the location will be inhabited by the households with the strongest 
tastes for living there, while the marginal household h* will receive the same utility as some 
reservation utility V  on offer in the rest of the country. Given the small relative size of the 
location, we take this reservation utility to be exogenous. The idiosyncratic taste of the 
marginal household must then be given by:  
( )*h V Y P Aε = − + − , (2) 
whereas only households with ( ) ( )*h hε ε≥  choose to reside in the location. Under the 
assumption that each household occupies one homogeneous unit of housing, the demand for 
housing units will therefore be given by: 
( ) ( ), , 1DQ Y P A H F V Y P A = − − + −  , (3) 
where F denotes the cumulative density function of the distribution of idiosyncratic tastes.12 
This distribution shapes the relationship between demand and prices – low taste dispersion 
implies that F is steep so that demand is highly elastic.  
On the supply side, we assume that housing development costs (i.e., land and conversion costs 
plus construction costs) are a quadratic function of the number of units in the location and that 
supply constraints X make this cost function more convex: 
( ) 212,S SC Q X Q X= . (4) 
10 Random utility theory treats the idiosyncratic taste as a random draw from some taste distribution. See 
Anderson et al. (1992) for an in-depth discussion of the foundations of this approach and Hilber and Robert-
Nicoud (2013) for a recent application to location choice across cities. Our characterisation of preferences 
closely mimics this latter paper. 
11 Productivity shocks at this higher level of spatial aggregation, in our framework, may still have differential 
local house price effects across LPAs with varying supply conditions.  
12 Treating ε(h) as a random variable means that expression (3) should be interpreted as expected demand. We 
will abstract from the stochastic aspect for ease of exposition and assume that F is the cumulative density 
function of the realized distribution of tastes.  
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This simple specification ensures that marginal development costs QSX rise more steeply and 
hence housing supply is less elastic in places in which supply constraints are more severe. 
Regulatory constraints are likely to reduce the sensitivity of new housing supply to demand 
shifts and the positive link between the availability of developable land and supply elasticity 
is also well documented in the theoretical literature – see Hilber and Mayer (2009) for a brief 
overview. We impose that 0X > , meaning that no place has infinitely elastic housing supply. 
A more realistic approximation of the true housing development cost function may be 
obtained by adding in a constant and linear terms in QS, X and QSX without changing our 
main result.13 Furthermore, by choosing an appropriate unit of measurement for X, we may 
arbitrarily scale the impact of 2SQ X  on development costs. 
Competitive developers will supply new housing until the price equals marginal development 
costs, so SP Q X= . Equating supply to demand by substituting (3) into this condition, we 
obtain: 
( )1P XH F V Y P A = − − + −  . (5) 
This condition implicitly defines the equilibrium price ( ),P Y X  of a housing unit in the 
location. This price depends on all the variables defined so far and on the distribution of 
tastes, but we only denote local earnings and supply constraints as explicit arguments for the 
sake of simplicity.  
The impact of a rise in local earnings on the equilibrium price is obtained by implicit 
differentiation of (5). If we assume that tastes are uniformly distributed over an interval with 
length 1 f , we obtain after some manipulation that: 
( ),
1
P Y X XHf
Y XHf
∂
=
∂ +
. (6) 
The derivative of the house price with respect to earnings is clearly positive, as an increase in 
local earnings induces households from the rest of the country to move into the location until 
the higher housing costs exactly offset the increased earnings potential. Importantly, the price 
response depends on supply constraints. By further differentiating equation (6) with respect to 
X, we obtain: 
( )
( )
2
2
,
1
P Y X Hf
Y X XHf
∂
=
∂ ∂ +
. (7) 
As can easily be verified, the derivative in (7) is again positive. Hence, our main proposition 
can be formulated as:  
PROPOSITION: Local house prices respond more sensitively to local earnings 
shocks in more supply constrained locations. 
13 The constant and the linear term in X do not affect marginal development costs. The linear terms in QS and 
QSX do not affect the derivative of marginal development costs with respect to earnings.  
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Although our focus in this paper is on the impact of earnings on house prices, the effect on 
house prices of a rise in A similarly depends on supply constraints.14 This prediction is 
consistent with the empirical finding in Hilber and Mayer (2009) that exogenous shocks to 
public school spending have larger effects on house prices in places with little undeveloped 
land. 
The second order derivative in expression (7) approaches zero when f gets large, implying 
that the severity of supply constraints does not influence the impact of earnings on house 
prices in this limiting case. The reason for this is that housing demand in equation (3) 
becomes perfectly elastic. A large f means that tastes are distributed on a small interval, so 
people have similar preferences for living in the location that we consider. This is the setting 
that Glaeser and Ward (2009) argue applies to local municipalities within the Greater Boston 
area and that could explain their empirical finding that their measure of local land use 
regulation does not affect local house prices.  
At the other extreme, the dispersion in tastes gets so large that households cease to regard 
alternative places as potential substitutes and effectively become perfectly immobile. This is 
the case when f approaches zero and it follows from expression (6) that the derivative of 
house prices to earnings then approaches zero as well, implying that there is no arbitrage 
between places and, as a result, the severity of supply constraints does not affect the house 
price response to shifts in earnings. However, even if there is no arbitrage between places, our 
Proposition should still hold if we consider that the demand for space per person rises with 
income (i.e., we relax our assumption that each household occupies one homogeneous unit of 
housing), so that richer households buy higher quality or larger houses and richer people are 
less likely to double-up with relatives and friends. In this setting, an earnings shock induced 
rise in demand for developed land increases its price in accord with the steepness of the 
developed land supply curve, which in turn depends on the severity of supply constraints. 
Moreover, by constraining housing improvements, regulation may also limit the supply of 
housing capital, thus further reinforcing the price response to an earnings-induced shift in 
demand for housing services. Although our empirical measure for the severity of regulatory 
constraints refers to the refusal rate of new construction projects, we expect it to be closely 
correlated with the regulatory stance to improvements of the existing housing stock. 
The above outlined framework is highly stylized and thus abstracts from a number of 
complicating factors. Importantly, our framework does not model the buy-rent decision as a 
possible margin of adjustment. We expect supply constraints to have similar effects on both 
the house price-earnings elasticity and the rent-earnings elasticity. This is, because under 
competitive conditions, profit-maximizing landlords will pass on any earnings shock-induced 
change in house prices to their tenants. After all, a rise in earnings benefits renters as well as 
homeowners and should thus also affect their willingness-to-pay. Nevertheless, it may be 
argued that in the short run, the demand for owner-occupied housing receives an additional 
push relative to the demand for renter-occupied housing, if the rise in earnings also eases 
14 As a result of the specification of utility in (1), the two variables are interchangeable in our model. 
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financial constraints (see e.g., Ortalo-Magné and Rady, 2006). This additional demand push 
should generate larger price effects in more supply constrained places.15  
Our theoretical framework also does not consider other demand factors – apart from earnings 
and amenities – that may affect local house prices. In our empirical analysis, we carefully 
control, however, for such factors by including in our estimating equation both year and LPA 
fixed effects. The year fixed effects absorb the impact of all factors that do not vary across 
places, such as mortgage interest rates and other macro-economic factors. The LPA fixed 
effects capture all time-invariant local demand factors. Another potential bias may arise from 
the omission of time-varying local demand shifters, other than earnings, that correlate 
systematically with the interaction of earnings and our instruments for supply constraints. We 
address this concern in a robustness check, discussed below, by identifying on exogenous 
labour demand shocks.  
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1. Data 
We use LPA-level house price and income data from 1974 to 2008 and geographically match 
this data, using 2001 English district shape files, with regulatory data derived from public 
records, physical constraints data derived from satellite imagery and historical population 
density and employment by industry from the Census. The LPA-level share of votes for the 
Labour party in the 1983 General Election is derived from the British Election Studies 
Information System. We briefly describe the variables below. Details on the computation of 
all variables are given in Appendix A. Summary statistics for the baseline sample are 
provided in Table 1. 
Our mix-adjusted house price index is derived from transaction price data from the Council of 
Mortgage Lenders (CML) (1974 to 1995) and the Land Registry (1995 to 2008). Our proxy 
for local housing demand, the total weekly gross earnings for full-time male workers, comes 
from the New Earnings Survey (NES) (1974 to 2004) and the Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings (ASHE) (2004 to 2008). The NES data is only available for the workplace. For 
consistency reasons, we collected the earnings data from the ASHE also at the workplace 
level. We discuss the implications of this in Section 4.2.3. 
We obtained our measures of LPA-level regulatory restrictiveness from the Department of 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG). Our key measure – the refusal rate of ‘major’ 
residential projects – is defined by the DCLG as the share of residential projects consisting of 
10 or more dwellings that was refused by an LPA in any particular year. The refusal rate of 
planning applications is a standard measure to capture regulatory restrictiveness. It is for 
example used in Cheshire and Sheppard (1989), Preston et al. (1996) or Bramley (1998). 
Figure B1 in Appendix B illustrates the average refusal rate by LPA, measured between 1979 
and 2008. Refusal rates over the last 30 years have been clearly highest in the Greater London 
Area and in the South and lowest in the North of the country. The second variable – the delay 
rate for major residential projects – is defined as the number of decisions that are delayed over 
15 In the longer run, discrepancies between local rents and the user cost of owner-occupied housing should be 
arbitraged away through conversions from rental to owner-occupied housing, although regulatory constraints 
may hamper this adjustment process as well. 
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13 weeks in any particular LPA and year relative to all decisions made in that LPA and year. 
The 13 weeks-threshold is a ‘performance’ target introduced by the Labour government in 
2002 with the intent to speed up the planning process. We use the change in the delay rate 
pre- and post- the policy reform as an instrumental variable to identify the potentially 
endogenous refusal rate. We discuss the rationale for this in Section 4.2.1. 
The literature broadly suggests two types of physical supply constraints measures. The first 
measure, the share developed land – the share of all developable land that is already 
developed – is derived from the 1990 Land Cover Map of Great Britain (LCMGB). As Figure 
B2 illustrates, local scarcity of open developable land is greatest in the Greater London Area 
and in and around the larger cities in the West Midlands (Birmingham) and the Northwest 
(Manchester), yet developable land seems amply available in most other areas – the share 
developed land does not exceed 15 percent in the median LPA.  
The second measure is derived from Ordinance Survey Panorama Digital Elevation data. 
Burchfield et al. (2005) and Saiz (2010) suggest that ruggedness and steep slopes impose 
barriers to new residential development. Following Burchfield et al. (2005), we use the range 
in elevation, defined as the difference between the minimum and the maximum elevation in 
an LPA, as a proxy for whether an LPA is in a mountainous area. Mountains at the fringe of 
development may hamper urban expansion. Figure B3 illustrates spatial variation in the 
elevation ranges across England, suggesting that steepness induced constraints may be 
greatest in the North and the West. The correlation between our elevation range indicator and 
the ‘share developed land’ is negative and fairly strong (-0.48), consistent with the 
proposition that uneven topography hampers residential development. 
4.2. Endogeneity Concerns and Identification Strategy 
Two of our supply constraints measures – the refusal rate and the share developed land – are 
subject to endogeneity concerns. Moreover, local earnings may also be influenced by house 
prices and supply conditions. Below we discuss how we address these concerns. 
4.2.1. Identifying the refusal rate 
The post-1947 British planning system has been characterised by LPAs deriving very limited 
fiscal benefits from permitting development but facing most or all of the development related 
infrastructure and congestion costs. As a consequence, LPAs often side with NIMBYs (‘not in 
my backyard’ residents) and hinder or refuse altogether new development projects within 
their borders – especially larger projects that require costly new infrastructure provisions. In 
this context, we would expect that LPAs that are comparably more restrictive refuse a greater 
share of major development projects.16 Our preferred measure of regulatory restrictiveness is 
then the refusal rate for major residential projects. Alas this measure, like all other direct 
measures of regulatory restrictiveness, is endogenous. One concern is that refusal rates are 
higher during boom periods when housing demand and hence house prices are high. 
‘Ambitious’ projects may only be put forward during boom periods and bureaucrats may be 
16 The restrictiveness may differ across LPAs for example because of differences in the vested interests and ideology of the 
constituency or because the benefits associated with certain development projects are greater for certain LPAs than others. 
For instance, LPAs with high unemployment rates may have greater incentives to permit development because of short-term 
job creation during the construction process. See Cheshire and Hilber (2008) for evidence in favor of this proposition. 
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overwhelmed with large piles of applications and so unable to deal with all of them. NIMBYs 
may also try harder to block new developments during boom times. We address these 
particular endogeneity concerns by using the average refusal rate over the entire period for 
which we have data; 1979 to 2008.17 However, at least one endogeneity concern remains, 
even when employing the average refusal rate and location fixed effects: developers may be 
less likely to submit a planning application in the first instance, when they know that the 
relevant LPA is very restrictive and the chance of refusal high. So in restrictive LPAs the 
observed refusal rate may underestimate the ‘true’ tightness of the local planning regime. In 
order to address this and other potential endogeneity concerns related to our refusal rate 
measure, we use two separate identification strategies. 
The first identification strategy exploits exogenous variation derived from a 2002 policy 
reform. On the 1st of April 2002 the Labour government introduced three new targets with the 
intention of speeding up the planning process. The main effect of the reform was that after 
2002 an explicit target for major development projects was in place, so LPAs could no longer 
significantly delay those projects and still meet their target by approving smaller projects 
more speedily. Of course not meeting targets is an option for LPAs. In fact, to our knowledge 
there are no explicit formal sanctions if an LPA does not meet a particular target. However, in 
practice the central government has powerful ‘tools’ of withholding financial resources to 
LPAs and of removing their leeway in decision-making such that LPAs de facto do have 
significant incentives to fulfil the government targets at least in the medium term; being on 
the ‘watch list’ for a short period of time may have less severe consequences. However, as is 
often the case, the policy reform had some perverse impacts such as major applications being 
turned down more quickly to meet the deadline, fewer pre-application discussions or longer 
delays in considering conditions (Barker, 2006). 
Our identification strategy exploits the fact that LPAs did have the option to substitute one 
form of ‘penalised’ restrictiveness (not meeting the delay target) with other ‘non-penalised’ 
forms (e.g., rejecting major applications in order to meet the key target). The observable 
implication is that changes in the refusal rate and changes in the delay rate should be 
uncorrelated before it became clear that the targets are introduced (all planning parameters are 
optimised in pre-reform equilibrium) but should become negatively correlated afterwards, as 
the restrictive LPAs can be expected to have altered their behaviour to reject more major 
residential applications (an increase in the refusal rate) in order to meet their delay target (a 
reduction in the delay rate). After the adjustment process induced by the policy reform is 
completed, the two variables can be expected to become uncorrelated again in the new 
equilibrium. The solid line in Figure 1 illustrates this point by plotting the regression 
coefficient of the two measures, change in refusal rate and change in delay rate, over time. 
The coefficient is relatively close to zero and not statistically different from zero for most 
years until about two years prior to the introduction of the new targets. Then it turns strongly 
negative post-reform, before returning again to close to zero, consistent with our proposition.  
17 Using the average rather than the contemporaneous or lagged refusal rate has the additional advantages that we 
can use the full period for which we observe house prices and earnings and that this variable is less noisy. 
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Our identifying assumption is that the policy reform had a differential impact on more and 
less restrictive LPAs. The most restrictive LPAs should have had the strongest incentives to 
delay major residential projects pre-reform, so were most likely not to meet the new key 
target. They also should have had the strongest incentives post-reform to reduce their delay 
rate for major projects by refusing a greater share of them in order to meet the key target. For 
less restrictive LPAs, with low refusal rates to begin with, there was no or less need to alter 
their behaviour to accommodate the target. Hence, rather than looking at the delay rate of an 
LPA, our instrument is the change in the delay rate pre- and post-reform; the most restrictive 
LPAs should have had the greatest decrease in the delay rate. In our empirical work we use 
the average of the delay rates between 1994 and 1996 as our measure of the delay rate prior to 
the reform. This time window is clearly before the involved agents started to anticipate the 
reform.18 Figure 1 suggests that during this time period the correlation between the change in 
the refusal rate and the change in the delay rate was indeed reasonably close to zero. As post 
reform window we use the period between 2004 and 2006, since most of the adjustment 
process had taken place during this time period: as Figure 1 illustrates, the negative 
correlation between the change in refusal rate and the change in delay rate during this period 
was quite strong.  
Our second identification strategy exploits exogenous variation arising from spatial variation 
in the share of votes to the Labour party at the General Election of 1983. Political party 
composition has been used for example by Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) and Sadun (2011) as 
an instrument for the restrictiveness of the local planning system.19 The rationale for this is as 
follows: low and middle income Labour voters have traditionally cared more about housing 
affordability and less about protection of house values; fewer low income residents own 
homes. Hence, we would expect the local share of votes to the Labour party to be negatively 
associated with the restrictiveness of the local planning system. Our identifying assumption is 
that, controlling for location fixed effects, the share of votes to Labour in 1983 affects the 
impact of earnings on house prices only through planning restrictiveness. We chose a General 
Election rather than a local election as the latter may be significantly affected by local 
housing market conditions or opposition to large scale local development projects. We chose 
the General Election of 1983 as it is the earliest year for which we could obtain General 
Election data that can be geographically matched to the LPA-level, thus further reducing the 
risk that election outcomes are reversely determined by outcomes of the planning process. 
4.2.2. Identifying the share developed land 
Whilst one of our physical constraints measures – the elevation range – is clearly exogenous, 
the share developed land in 1990 is arguably endogenous as well. How developed a particular 
location is, is an equilibrium outcome; the result of demand and supply side pressures. For 
example, more desirable places will attract more inhabitants and will consequently be more 
developed. Similarly, more restrictive LPAs should have more open land for future 
18 Our choice of the pre-reform window is influenced by the fact that the Labour Government, which eventually 
introduced the delay rate targets, took office in May 1997. When taking office, it was making a lot of political 
noise, about the ‘scandal’ of planning delays and had announced they were going to act to reduce delays. It 
seems reasonable to assume that no LPA could have anticipated the 2002-reform prior to 1997. 
19 Sadun (2011) explores whether planning regulation in Britain protects independent retailers. She argues that 
Conservatives have traditionally been associated with a strong opposition towards big-box retailing. 
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development, all else equal. Hence, contemporaneous land scarcity could be in part explained 
by the tightness of the planning system during our sample period (e.g., through allocation of 
Greenbelts) or in fact by many other contemporaneous factors that may also affect house 
prices. In order to address this endogeneity concern we use historic population density in 
1911 as an instrument to identify the share developed land in 1990. This instrument pre-dates 
the ‘birth’ of the modern British planning system – the Town and Country Planning Act of 
1947 – by several decades. Our identifying assumption is that the population density almost 
100 years ago will be indicative of early forms of agglomeration (and local amenities), so we 
expect the variable to be strongly correlated with the share of developed land almost 100 
years later but, controlling for LPA fixed effects that capture local amenities, we would not 
expect historic density to directly (other than through land scarcity) explain changes in 
contemporaneous house prices. 
4.2.3. Identifying shifts in housing demand 
In our empirical analysis we use male weekly earnings at the LPA-level as a shifter of the 
local housing demand curve. Our earnings measure refers to earnings by place of work and 
not by place of residence. While a residence based measure of earnings may be a better proxy 
for local housing demand (i.e., not all local workers demand housing locally but all residents 
do), the workplace-based measure relates more directly to shocks to local labour demand. 
Such shocks may be caused by a shock to an industry that is well represented in the area. The 
mining industry provides an obvious example. Access to coal used to be an important 
determinant of productivity in the era of manufacturing, but in today’s service based economy 
it is barely relevant. Depending on their past industry composition, some locations have 
suffered considerably more from this change than others.  
Local earnings, however, also depend on the responsiveness of labour supply to shocks in 
demand. In turn, the responsiveness of local labour supply depends on how easily the housing 
stock can be extended to accommodate new workers. Glaeser et al. (2006) and Saks (2008) 
have documented the impact of housing supply conditions on local labour market outcomes in 
the US.  
In order to address this endogeneity concern, we consider the robustness of our main results to 
identifying variation in earnings on shocks to labour demand due to the local industry 
composition of employment in 1971 and changes in employment by industry at the national 
level. Our shock measure is the level of employment in each LPA that would have resulted 
given its industry composition in 1971, had employment in each industry developed in the 
same way as at the national level. So for instance, this measure predicts a large drop in 
employment in areas that were specialized in mining. We discuss details of the construction 
of the labour demand shock measure in Appendix C. This measure is exogenous to the extent 
that local labour supply shocks have a negligible impact on industry employment at the 
national level, which seems plausible in view of the large number of geographical units in our 
analysis and the small number of industries to which we disaggregate employment.20 Similar 
20 The seven industries are: agriculture; mining; manufacturing; construction; utilities and transport; distribution 
and services; national and local government services and defense.  
15 
shock measures have been used in for instance Bartik (1991), Blanchard and Katz (1992) and 
Saks (2008).  
4.3. Empirical Baseline IV-Specification 
In line with our theoretical prediction that local house prices respond more sensitively to local 
earnings shocks in more supply constrained locations, we interact all three measures of local 
supply constraints – regulatory restrictiveness, land scarcity and uneven topography – with 
local annual earnings and include annual earnings as a separate control. We instrument the 
refusal rate and the share developed land by employing the identification strategies discussed 
above. This approach allows us to assess to what extent the three supply constraints amplify 
the impact of earnings on house prices. Our baseline specification is: 
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The bold variables are instrumented to identify causal effects. The upper bar indicates an 
average over all years, for which we have planning application data. The specification 
includes year-fixed effects Dt and LPA-fixed effects Dj to capture all unobserved 
characteristics that do not vary across space or over time. 
We standardise all three supply constraint measures to ease interpretation of the coefficients. 
We subtract the sample mean of each supply constraint measure from the measure itself and 
divide this difference by the standard deviation of the measure. This transformation allows us 
to interpret the estimated coefficients as an increase in the house price-earnings elasticity due 
to a one standard deviation increase in the respective constraint measure. By implication, the 
coefficient on the earnings variable can be interpreted as the house price-earnings elasticity 
for an LPA with average levels of supply constraints. 
4.4. Main Results 
Table 2 summarises our main findings. In column (1) of Panel A we report the results of 
estimating equation (8) with naïve OLS, so we don’t instrument the supply constraint 
measures. All observations are clustered by pre-1996 counties as the earnings and house price 
data for earlier years had to be partly inferred from county-level information (see Appendix A 
for details). The coefficient on the price-earnings elasticity is highly statistically significant 
and positive, taking a value of 0.32, implying that in an LPA with average levels of 
constraints, a (permanent) 10 percent increase in earnings raises house prices by 3.2 percent. 
The coefficients on the earnings × supply constraints interactions point to modest but 
statistically significant heterogeneity of this elasticity across LPAs: the house price-earnings 
elasticity rises by 0.067 in an LPA in which the refusal rate is one standard deviation above 
the English average and by 0.093 in an LPA in which the share developed land is one 
standard deviation above the English average. The elevation range does not appear to affect 
the house price-earnings elasticity in a statistically significant manner.  
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Results for our baseline IV specification in equation (8) are reported in columns (2) to (4) of 
Panel A. The specification in column (2) uses all available instruments to identify the 
endogenous variables, columns (3) and (4) drop, respectively, the share votes to Labour and 
the change in delay rate. The corresponding first-stage results are shown in columns (1) to (6) 
of Panel B.  
The IV results of our preferred specification with all instruments, reported in column (2) of 
Panel A, indicate that a one standard deviation increase in the refusal rate raises the house 
price-earnings elasticity by 0.29 and a one standard deviation increase in the share of 
developed land raises the elasticity by 0.30. The coefficients on the two interaction terms are 
more than four times and more than three times, respectively, larger than the corresponding 
naïve OLS-coefficients. Furthermore, the estimates now point to the elevation range as a 
statistically significant barrier to construction as well: a one standard deviation increase in this 
variable raises the house price-earnings elasticity by 0.095. Conditional on the validity of our 
exclusion restrictions, these may be interpreted as causal effects. The coefficient on earnings 
is smaller than in the previous specification yet it is imprecisely estimated. 
While the estimated coefficients suggest that average refusal rates and the share of 
developable land developed have similar effects, in reality regulatory constraints are much 
more severe than local land scarcity induced constraints in most LPAs. The distribution of the 
latter variable is much more skewed (skewness=1.18) than the former (skewness=0.33). Only 
in the most urbanised areas, physical supply constraints are genuinely binding in a 
quantitative sense. We further explore the quantitative significance of our findings in a 
counterfactual analysis in Section 5. 
The remaining TSLS-specifications reported in columns (3) and (4) of Panel A test the 
sensitivity of our results to the strategy employed to identify the refusal rate. In column (3) we 
only use the change in delay rate to identify the impact of the refusal rate. In column (4) we 
only use the share of votes to Labour. Given the different nature of the two identification 
strategies, it is reassuring that the effect of regulatory constraints on the house price-earnings 
elasticity is highly significant in both cases. Estimates of both regulatory and physical 
constraints are higher when we use the share of votes to Labour as an instrument. Our 
preferred specification in column (2) yields effects that are in between the two estimates.  
Corresponding first-stage results in Panel B indicate that our instruments for the refusal rate 
and the share developed land all have the predicted signs and are highly statistically 
significant. The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic suggests that weak identification may not be a 
concern, even when we only use the change in delay rate or the share votes to Labour as 
single instruments to identify the refusal rate. 
The year fixed effects in our various estimates in Table 2 – illustrated in Figure 2 – imply 
cyclical behaviour at the aggregate level. Our counterfactual analysis in Section 5 explores to 
what extent cyclical behaviour can be explained by local supply constraints.  
4.5. Results for Boom and Bust Periods 
Barriers to construction ought to matter less during periods with weak local housing demand. 
Since the existing housing stock is durable, when local demand is falling, the relevant part of 
17 
the supply curve is almost perfectly inelastic, irrespective of the presence of any man-made or 
physical supply constraints – the supply curve is ‘kinked’ (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005).  
Table 3 tests the conjecture that supply constraints are more binding during boom than bust 
periods. We define ‘bust periods’ as years when average real house price growth in England 
was negative: from 1974 to 1977, in 1981 and 1982, from 1990 to 1996 and in 2008.21 The 
remaining years are, somewhat casually, labelled ‘boom periods’. Results from separately 
estimating our preferred specification, which uses all available instruments, on the sub-
samples of boom and bust years are shown in columns (1) and (2). Consistent with theory, we 
find that the impact of a one standard deviation increase in the refusal rate is almost twice as 
large during ‘booms’ than ‘busts’, raising the house price-earnings elasticity by 0.27 and 0.15, 
respectively. A one standard deviation increase in the share of developed land raises the house 
price-earnings elasticity by 0.29 during ‘booms’ and by 0.20 during ‘busts’. The difference 
between these effects – tested either separately or jointly – is statistically significant.  
4.6. Alternative Geographical Scales 
Our main analysis is conducted at the LPA-level, because this corresponds with the 
geographical scale at which planning decisions are made. However, housing markets of 
proximate LPAs may be strongly integrated. As a robustness check, in Table 4 we therefore 
report specifications for three alternative geographical scales at a higher level of spatial 
aggregation: Travel to Work Areas (TTWAs), Functional Urban Regions (FURs) and Pre-
1996 counties. TTWAs, of which there are 150 in England, are designed to capture local 
labour markets. TTWAs are subdivided into urban and rural areas; as a further robustness 
check we also estimate our main specification on the subset of 71 urban TTWAs. FURs 
constitute an alternative definition of integrated urban housing markets, which is based on 
commuting patterns in 1990. The analysis at Pre-1996 county level also verifies robustness of 
our results for imputing LPA-level earnings data from county and London borough-level data 
prior to 1997. Our sample consists of 55 FURs and 46 Pre-1996 counties.  
Table 4 reports results at different geographical scales for our preferred specification (column 
2 of Table 2). LPA-level results are reproduced in column (1) for ease of comparison. 
Columns (2) to (5) report results for alternative geographical scales. All observations are 
weighted with the number of households in the 1990 Census, since the different geographical 
units vary enormously in their household size. For instance, the smallest TTWA, Berwick, 
contains hardly more than 10,000 households, whereas the number of households exceeds 
three million in London. In order to make coefficients comparable across specifications, we 
standardise supply constraints to their standard deviation at LPA level, so that at each 
geographical scale, coefficients correspond to a one LPA-level standard deviation change.  
Results turn out to be remarkably homogeneous across different geographical scales, 
indicating that our results are largely unaffected by spatial correlation between LPAs. The 
estimated impact of a one LPA-level standard deviation increase in refusal rates on the house 
price-earnings elasticity ranges from 0.23 for urban TTWAs to 0.33 for pre-1996 counties, 
while the estimated impact of a one LPA-level standard deviation increase in the share of 
21 We could not infer an average growth rate for the first year in our sample, but national house price data leave 
little doubt that 1974 was a bust year (see e.g., Muellbauer and Murphy, 1997). 
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developed land ranges from 0.22 for pre-1996 counties to 0.30 at the LPA level. The 
coefficients are always highly statistically significant. Results for the elevation range are 
similarly homogeneous. The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic suggests that at higher spatial levels 
of aggregation, identification tends to become stronger.  
4.7. Potential Endogeneity of Earnings 
Our empirical analysis so far has ignored any possible influence that house prices and supply 
conditions may have on earnings, our housing demand shifter. In order to address this 
endogeneity concern, the first column in Panel A of Table 5 replicates our baseline 
specification – column (2) of Table 2 – but replaces earnings with the labour demand shock 
measure described in Section 4.2.3.22 Consistent with our baseline results, reassuringly, we 
find that the impact of this shock on house prices depends on both regulatory and physical 
supply constraints, with all three interaction effects being highly statistically significant.  
While corresponding first-stage results in Panel B show that our instruments for the refusal 
rate and the share developed land all have the predicted signs and are highly statistically 
significant, the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic cautions that weak identification may be an issue. 
Since Table 4 indicates that our identification becomes considerably stronger at higher levels 
of spatial aggregation, we replicate the analysis at the level of TTWAs. These areas are 
designed to correspond with the local labour market area level, so they may also be more 
appropriate for analysing the impact of labour demand shocks. Results are reported in the 
second column in Panel A of Table 5. We again standardise supply constraints to their 
standard deviation at the LPA level so the coefficients in columns (1) and (2) of Panel A are 
directly comparable. Supply constraints – especially regulatory constraints – turn out to be 
highly significant determinants of the sensitivity of house prices to shifts in demand, while 
weak identification is no longer an issue.  
While the results in Table 5 mitigate concerns about the endogeneity of earnings, the 
quantitative significance of these estimates cannot be directly compared with the baseline 
results. We revisit this issue in the counterfactual analysis. 
4.8. Additional Robustness Checks 
We carried out a large number of additional robustness checks. The main results are reported 
in Appendix D, while the interested reader is referred to Hilber and Vermeulen (2010) for 
more extensive checks. 
To begin with, demand for housing may have increased faster in places closer to London in a 
way that is not fully captured by existing controls in our baseline specifications. To address 
this, Table D1 adds to our baseline specifications a term that interacts a linear time trend with 
the distance between the centroid of the LPA and Charing Cross/Trafalgar Square in the heart 
of London.23 It turns out that this interaction effect is statistically significant only in the OLS 
22 While the correlation between earnings and the labour demand shock is statistically significant, using the 
shock as an instrument for earnings rather than entering it directly produces weakly identified results.  
23 Charing Cross is the ‘official’ centre of London (see http://www.bbc.co.uk/london/content/articles/2005 
/08/15/charingcross_feature.shtml). Nevertheless we experimented with alternative definitions of ‘centre of 
London’. Specifically, we chose the centroid of the ‘City of London’ and King’s Cross as alternative central 
points. Results are, not surprisingly, nearly identical. 
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specification, whereas it is completely statistically insignificant in the TSLS specifications. 
Moreover, except in the OLS case, the impacts of the various supply constraints measures on 
the house price-earnings elasticity are very similar compared to the baseline specifications 
reported in Table 2.  
Table D2 reproduces our baseline results for a sample from which all LPAs in the Greater 
London Area (GLA) are removed. We do this to explore to what extent our results are driven 
by the country’s dominant city and capital.24 Interestingly, while the results for the regulatory 
constraints interactions remain statistically significant and quantitatively meaningful, the 
positive coefficient on the share developed land × earnings interaction term becomes much 
smaller and statistically insignificant suggesting that the impact of the share developed land 
on the price-earnings elasticity may be largely confined to the highly urbanised GLA. This 
finding is consistent with the fact, discussed in Section 4.4 and illustrated in Figure B2, that 
the share developed land measure is highly skewed with only few LPAs – mainly 
concentrated in the GLA – facing genuine scarcity of open developable land and most LPAs 
having open developable space in abundance. 
In another set of tests, we explore the robustness of our findings to alternative definitions of 
our instruments. With regard to the change-in-delay-rate instrument, Table D3 reports both 
first and second-stage results, using 2003-2008 as post reform window and either 1979-2001 
(using all pre-reform years) or 1996-2001 (using a symmetric 6 year window) as pre-reform 
windows. We report specifications where we use the change in delay-rate instrument (but not 
the Labour share one) – as in column (3) of Table 2 – so as not to confound the robustness 
check with the second instrument used to identify the refusal rate. In Hilber and Vermeulen 
(2010), we carried out a number of additional, related, robustness checks. We altered the pre- 
and post-reform time window of our change-in-delay-rate instrument by one year in each 
direction. We also used the share of votes to Labour in alternative General Election years: 
1997 (a Labour landslide unlike 1983, which was a Conservative landslide), 2005 (a 
comparably close Labour victory) and the average of the three years 1983, 1997 and 2005. 
Results are very similar in all cases. 
Table D4 explores whether the results in Table 5 are robust to identifying only on the change 
in the delay rate (column 1 in Panel A) or only on the share of votes to Labour in 1983 
(column 2). We consider the TTWA-level to get sufficiently strong identification. It turns out 
that the coefficient on the refusal rate × labour demand shock variable is remarkably constant 
independent of whether we only use (i) the change in delay rate (0.85), (ii) the share of votes 
to Labour (0.75), or both instruments (0.76). All coefficients are statistically significant at the 
one percent level. 
In a set of further tests, reported in Hilber and Vermeulen (2010), we replicated our analysis 
but used alternative measures for our supply constraint proxies. To begin with, we utilised a 
measure for share developed land that treats semi-developable land as non-developable (in 
our main specifications we treated semi-developable land as developable). ‘Semi-
developable’ land includes land cover categories that are common in flood risk areas. It also 
24 Removing only the City of London (the city’s central business district) from our sample as an alternative 
robustness check leaves results virtually unchanged.  
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includes land cover categories that are at the margin of being developable because of e.g. 
geological constraints. Next, we used alternative measures to proxy for slope related physical 
constraints. Specifically we used two measures that are based on the range between highest 
and lowest altitude (dummy variables that take the value of one if the elevation range in 
metres is in the top 75th / in the top 90th percentile). The two measures take into account that 
the effect of ruggedness may be highly non-linear. Finally, we repeated this exercise but used 
an altogether different measure for slope related constraints: the standard deviation of slopes 
in degrees. Results were virtually unaltered in all cases. 
5. Counterfactual Analysis
In this section, we carry out a counterfactual analysis in order to develop a better 
understanding of the quantitative implications of our empirical findings. Before turning to a 
discussion of the results, we should stress that they ought to be interpreted with some caution. 
Our main counterfactual scenarios are based on the estimated impact of earnings induced 
demand shifts in conjunction with local supply constraints on local house prices. While 
earnings are an important determinant of housing demand, the house price effect of other 
determinants such as demographic change has likely been inflated in more supply constrained 
places too. Furthermore, the substitutability of housing across LPAs is likely to be substantial, 
so that some of the effects of local supply constraints may operate at the aggregate level. In 
the unrealistic extreme case of perfect substitutability, constraints on local supply would not 
affect local prices at all relative to prices in other places, but they would push up the 
aggregate price level. Incorporating such repercussions at the aggregate level would require a 
full general equilibrium analysis of all local housing markets in England, which is beyond the 
scope of this paper. By implication, our counterfactuals represent a potentially significant 
underestimation of the aggregate implications of supply constraints and, in particular, of the 
planning system. We underestimate the effect of regulatory constraints even further to the 
extent that they were already binding in 1974. This is a real possibility given that the British 
Town and Country Planning Act was already introduced in 1947. In fact, as noted earlier, 
evidence provided by Hall et al. (1973) suggests that this was likely the case.  
We conduct our main counterfactual analysis on the basis of the three TSLS specifications 
reported in Table 2. Our preferred specification with all instruments provides a ‘baseline 
estimate’. The two distinct identification strategies for the refusal rate measure provide a 
bandwidth of plausible quantitative effects: in the context of the caveats discussed above, they 
offer a ‘lowest bound’ and ‘lower upper bound’ estimate, respectively. Each specification 
yields a prediction of local house prices conditional on local earnings, local supply constraints 
and LPA and period fixed effects. Counterfactual scenarios are then obtained by predicting 
house prices with supply constraints set to zero one by one, which allows us to get a sense of 
the quantitative importance of the separate constraints. However, since removing supply 
constraints entirely may be unrealistic in practice, we create alternative scenarios by removing 
only one standard deviation of each supply constraints measure. In order to quantify the 
impact of local income dynamics in the absence of supply constraints, we also subtract the 
‘independent’ earnings term. This is done for each LPA separately first, and then we take the 
averages of the predicted house prices and counterfactual scenarios over all locations to derive 
a counterfactual scenario for the ‘average’ English LPA.  
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The results of this exercise are summarised in Table 6. The complementary Figures 3 and 4 
illustrate the impact of the various local supply constraints and the independent effect of local 
earnings fluctuations graphically and over the entire sample period. Figure B4 illustrates the 
scenarios for a few distinctive LPAs that are known to be comparably restrictive or 
unrestrictive: Westminster and Newcastle upon Tyne were the most and least restrictive 
markets with respect to regulating office space in Cheshire and Hilber (2008). Reading and 
Darlington represent a relatively restrictive and a relatively relaxed local authority in Cheshire 
and Sheppard (1995). House prices are in logarithms and their value in 1974 is subtracted in 
all four LPAs in order to improve comparability. Finally, we vary the regulatory 
restrictiveness of the ‘average’ LPA to several alternative levels: the 10th and the 90th 
percentile of the restrictiveness distribution and the level of the least and most restrictive 
English region, that is, the North East and the South East. Figure 5 illustrates the predicted 
real house prices over the sample period for the ‘average’ English LPA and these 
counterfactual scenarios, as well as for scenarios in which restrictiveness is either increased or 
reduced by one standard deviation.  
Bearing the various caveats in mind, the scenarios point to a substantial impact of regulatory 
supply constraints: house prices in the ‘average’ LPA in England in 2008 would be 21.5 
(lowest bound) to 38.1 percent (lower upper bound) lower if the planning system were 
completely relaxed. The baseline estimate yields a reduction of 35 percent. The standard 
deviation of prices during the sample period would be between 29.7 and 51.6 percent lower, 
with the baseline being 47.6 percent. Removing all regulatory barriers is not very realistic, but 
even reducing the restrictiveness by one standard deviation leads to a 14 percent reduction in 
house prices using the baseline estimate, and a 19 percent reduction in the standard deviation. 
Figure 5 illustrates that setting the restrictiveness level to the 10th percentile of the distribution 
or to the level measured in the North East also yields substantial reductions in house prices. 
House prices would be roughly 25 percent lower in the South East, had it the restrictiveness 
level of the North East, which is arguably still highly restrictive in an international context. 
Consistent with the observation that physical supply constraints are genuinely binding in a 
quantitative sense only in few highly urbanized areas (Sections 4.4 and 4.8), our 
counterfactual analysis points to a modest average impact relative to that of regulatory 
constraints: house prices (their standard deviation) would be 9.9 to 10.5 (12.6 to 13.1) percent 
lower absent of scarcity constraints and 2.8 to 3.1 (3.3 to 3.6) percent lower in the absence of 
elevation differentials. As expected, local earnings have little impact on house prices once 
supply constraints are removed. 
As Figure B4 illustrates, the impact of the different types of constraints varies significantly 
across locations. In the densely developed borough of Westminster, physical constraints 
matter most, regulatory constraints are most important in the prosperous provincial town of 
Reading and in Newcastle and Darlington house prices are comparably little influenced by 
supply constraints.  
Not all of the house price dynamics is explained by local earnings dynamics and the 
differential effects it has depending on local supply constraints. Even when holding local 
earnings and their interactions with local supply constraints constant, average house prices in 
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England, as illustrated in Figure 3, would have increased between 1974 and 2008 in real 
terms. In as far as earnings fail to capture the full variation in local housing demand, omitted 
local demand shifters may account for some of the unexplained variation. Nevertheless, we 
speculate that this residual price dynamics reflects, at least in part, the aggregate impact of 
local supply constraints in conjunction with local earnings fluctuations, as discussed above. It 
may also be the result of macro-economic factors such as fluctuations in interest rates, 
financial liberalization or aggregate income shocks. However, in line with life-cycle macro-
models that assume that the supply of land is inelastic (e.g., Ortalo-Magne and Rady, 2006; 
Kiyotaki et al., 2011), the impacts of these aggregate demand factors still depend on supply 
constraints such as those introduced by the rigid English land use planning system.25 We also 
cannot rule out that the residual effects are due to adaptive expectations in conjunction with 
construction lags, although, as already discussed in Section 2, Cameron et al. (2006) provide 
evidence against the ‘bubble hypothesis’ for UK regions, at least for the period between 1972 
and 2003.  
We replicate the counterfactual analysis on the basis of results in which the labour demand 
shock variable is used as a demand shifter. This still does not allow us to directly compare the 
estimates in Tables 2 and 5, because any differences may be due to coefficient estimates as 
well as variation in the local demand shifter. Nevertheless, the analysis does allow us to get a 
sense of the quantitative significance of the results reported in Table 5. The two panels in 
Table 7 show results at the level of LPAs and TTWAs and have otherwise the same setup as 
in Table 6. While removing supply constraints one by one appears to reduce counterfactual 
house prices by less than in the case of earnings, the effect is still considerable. In particular, 
using the results at the TTWA level, removing regulatory constraints in an average TTWA 
would lower house prices by 16.3 percent and they would drop by another 4.8 percent if both 
physical supply constraints would disappear as well. Since local housing demand is affected 
by many other shifts than the one that is driven by composition with regard to a small number 
of broad industries in 1971 and subsequent national growth, the extent to which these 
counterfactual figures understate the true impact of supply constraints is likely to be very 
considerable.   
6. Conclusions
Housing affordability has been a vital policy concern in Britain for the larger part of the past 
one and a half decades, leading many to speak of an ‘affordability crisis’. Especially young 
households increasingly struggle to get ‘their feet on the property ladder’ and to afford a 
‘decent home’, particularly in the Greater London Area and the South of England but also 
elsewhere. Our findings point to the English planning system as an important causal factor 
behind the crisis. Moreover, recent studies have suggested that regulatory constraints have 
become more binding over the last few decades (in the US: Glaeser et al. 2005a; in the UK: 
Cheshire and Hilber, 2008) and may become even more binding – across the globe – in the 
future (Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2013). To the extent the latter is true; our findings imply 
that affordability problems may become even worse during future upswings, especially in 
25 To the extent that the price effect of such macro-economic factors has been reinforced by supply constraints, 
our counterfactual analysis again underestimates the impact of these constraints on aggregate house prices.  
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highly urbanised areas, where the house price to income ratio may rise even more 
dramatically than elsewhere. 
Our empirical analysis suggests that the English planning system has also made house prices 
substantially more volatile. Most owner-occupiers have to ‘overinvest’ in housing due to an 
investment constraint induced by owner-occupied housing (Henderson and Ioannides, 1983). 
Hence, in contrast to corporate and institutional investors, constrained owner-occupier 
households cannot adequately diversify their portfolios. An increase in house price volatility 
increases this distortion and therefore reduces the likelihood of owning, all else equal (Turner, 
2003; Hilber, 2005). Existing homeowners may be to some extent protected from price 
fluctuations. If they move within the same market, then if they buy high they should be able 
to sell high (and vice versa). Even if households move between markets they will be protected 
to the extent that the covariance in house prices between the two markets is high (Sinai and 
Souleles, 2013). However, this argument does not apply to first-time buyers who typically 
face severe credit constraints (having low levels of accumulated wealth and relatively junior 
salaries), are in need of high leverage and are fully exposed to market conditions.26 These are 
also the households that are most affected by the ‘affordability crisis’.  
An increase in house price volatility, through the consumption channel, also has important 
negative consequences for the macro-economy. A higher degree of house price volatility may 
lead to increased volatility of consumption and reduced macro-economic stability. It was 
these types of considerations that lead the UK government to scrutinise the planning system 
and its relationship with the wider economy in the first instance (Barker, 2004, 2006).  
Finally, we note that our findings do not necessarily suggest that the British planning system 
as a whole is welfare decreasing. There are considerable potential benefits from some aspects 
of regulation (internalization of negative externalities; provision of local public goods; 
reduction of uncertainty27) that will be positively capitalised into land values, so are not due 
to pure costs imposed by regulatory supply constraints. Cheshire and Sheppard (2002) did 
estimate the net welfare effects of restrictions on land supply in Reading. Their estimates 
imply that the restrictions had a small effect on benefits relative to costs, resulting in a net 
welfare cost equivalent to nearly 4 percent as an annual income tax. However, since our study 
merely quantifies the total impact of regulatory supply constraints on house prices, we are not 
able to take a conclusive stand on the net welfare impact. Nevertheless, our findings have 
important and worrying policy implications, at least for certain groups of the population. 
26 In England most first-time buyers are almost fully exposed to the interest rate risk. Mortgage lenders often 
offer a two year fixed rate – the so called ‘teaser rate’ – but this subsequently becomes a flexible rate, determined 
by market conditions. Hence housing affordability is strongly adversely affected if interest rates increase 
unexpectedly. 
27 Strict planning controls reduce, for example, the uncertainty that a neighbour may add an extra story to an 
existing house, thereby destroying a nice view into a public park. However, as for example Mayo and Sheppard 
(2001) or Ball et al. (2009) point out, lengthy and costly planning applications with uncertain outcomes also 
generate uncertainty on the side of developers and/or future occupants.  
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TABLES 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics: Regression Sample 
Obs. 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
Min. Max. overall between within 
Panel data 
Real house price index (1974 = 100) 12355 142.9 71.1 14.7 69.6 35.8 711.2 
Real male weekly earnings (2008 GBP) 12355 485.4 117.6 68.1 95.9 223.9 1394.1 
Refusal rate of major residential projects (%), 
1979-2008 10539 25.4 17.3 8.7 15.0 0 100.0 
Share of major residential decisions over 13 weeks 
(%), 1979-2008 (delay rate) 10539 43.4 22.4 8.6 20.7 0 100.0 
Predicted employment based on 1971 local industry 
composition and national employment growth 12355 57403 47561 47462 3946 3455 501427 
Cross-sectional data 
Average refusal rate over period 1979 - 2008 (%) * 353 25.4 8.7 0 50.9 
Share of developable land developed in 1990 (%) † 353 25.7 23.3 0.9 97.6 
Range between highest and lowest altitude (m) 353 208.8 171.2 5.0 975.0 
Change in delays between 1994-1996 and 2004-2006 353 -3.1 22.0 -63.5 53.1 
Change in delays between 1979-2001 and 2003-2008 353 -1.0 15.4 -61.9 47.7 
Change in delays between 1996-2001 and 2003-2008 353 -14.4 17.7 -71.1 31.1 
Share of votes for Labour, 1983 General Election (%) 353 16.3 9.1 0.1 41.0 
Population density in 1911 (persons per km2) 353 733.3 2561.6 3.3 22028.8 
Range between highest and lowest altitude (m) 353 208.8 171.2 5.0 975.0 
Distance to Trafalgar square (km) 353 164.3 115.0 2.6 478.8 
Number of households in 1991 353 53158 37086 2169 374079 
Notes: * Skewness = 0.33; median = 0.25. † Skewness = 1.18; median = 0.15. 
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Table 2 
Baseline Specifications: OLS and TSLS (N=12355, LPAs=353) 
PANEL A – Dependent variable: Log (real house price index) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
TSLS: Second stage 
OLS All three instruments All but share Labour All but change in delay rate 
Log(real male weekly earnings) 0.317*** 0.0887 0.200** 0.0436 
(0.0494) (0.0859) (0.0811) (0.103) 
Av. refusal rate of major residential projects ×
log(real male weekly earnings) 
0.0669*** 0.293*** 0.164*** 0.339*** 
(0.0157) (0.0566) (0.0627) (0.0635) 
Share of developable land developed in 1990 
×  log(real male weekly earnings)
0.0935** 0.295*** 0.234*** 0.331*** 
(0.0399) (0.0493) (0.0437) (0.0498) 
Range between highest and lowest altitude ×
log(real male weekly earnings) 
-0.000473 0.0951** 0.0714** 0.112*** 
(0.0214) (0.0388) (0.0322) (0.0427) 
LPA and year fixed effects (and constant) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared overall / within / between 0.327 / 0.957 / 0.0877 
Kleibergen-Paap F 11.75 10.70 10.54 
Critical values (10/15/20/25% max. IV size) 13.43/8.18/6.40/5.45 7.03/4.58/3.95/3.63 7.03/4.58/3.95/3.63 
PANEL B – TSLS: First stage 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Refusal×  Earnings 
Developed ×
Earnings 
Refusal×  
Earnings 
Developed ×
Earnings 
Refusal×  
Earnings 
Developed ×
Earnings 
Log(real male weekly earnings) 0.523** -0.0486 0.926*** -0.266** 0.562** -0.0383 
(0.215) (0.105) (0.310) (0.126) (0.236) (0.107) 
Change in delay rate b/w 1994-1996 and 2004-
2006 ×  log(real male weekly earnings) 
-0.139*** -0.0364 -0.241*** 0.0188 
(0.0410) (0.0306) (0.0556) (0.0326) 
Share votes for Labour in 1983 ×  log(real
male weekly earnings) 
-0.516*** 0.278*** -0.549*** 0.269*** 
(0.0746) (0.0505) (0.0789) (0.0486) 
Population density in 1911 (persons per km2) 
×  log(real male weekly earnings)
-0.154*** 0.429*** -0.250*** 0.480*** -0.159*** 0.428*** 
(0.0211) (0.0379) (0.0312) (0.0405) (0.0225) (0.0386) 
Range between highest and lowest altitude ×
log(real male weekly earnings) 
-0.00296 -0.400*** 0.0361 -0.421*** -0.0226 -0.405*** 
(0.0550) (0.0842) (0.0616) (0.0901) (0.0564) (0.0858) 
LPA and year fixed effects (and constant) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared overall model 0.363 0.560 0.106 0.495 0.345 0.559 
R-squared within model 0.376 0.655 0.205 0.609 0.361 0.654 
R-squared between model 0.363 0.560 0.106 0.495 0.345 0.559 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold variables are endogenously determined. All supply constraints measures are standardised. 
Observations are clustered by pre-1996 counties. 
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Table 3 
Impact of Supply Constraints during Boom and Bust (TSLS, 2nd Stage) 
(1) (2) 
Boom Bust 
Log(real male weekly earnings) 0.115 0.0651 
(0.0792) (0.104) 
Refusal rate ×  log(real male weekly earnings) * 0.267*** 0.152** 
(0.0549) (0.0605) 
Share developed in 1990 ×  log(real male weekly earnings) * 0.290*** 0.200*** 
(0.0447) (0.0508) 
Range in altitude ×  log(real male weekly earnings) 0.0967** 0.0938*** 
(0.0415) (0.0337) 
LPA fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 7766 4589 
Number of LPAs 353 353 
Kleibergen-Paap F 11.37 11.52 
Critical values (10/15/20/25% max. IV size) 13.43/8.18/6.40/5.45 13.43/8.18/6.40/5.45 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold variables are endogenously determined. 
Instruments include: Change in delay rate b/w 1994-1996 and 2004-2006, share votes for Labour in 1983 and population 
density in 1911. All supply constraints measures are standardised. Observations are clustered by pre-1996 counties. Boom is 
defined as: national real HP growth > 0%. Bust is defined as: national real HP growth < 0%. * Test of equality of the 
coefficient rejects with p=0.02. Joint test of equality of all three interaction effect-coefficients rejects with p=0.01. 
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Table 4 
Robustness Check: Baseline Specification for Different Geographical Scales 
(TSLS, 2nd Stage) 
Dependent variable: Log(real house price index) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Geographical unit: Local Planning 
Authority 
Travel to Work 
Area 
Urban Travel to 
Work Area 
Functional Urban 
Region 
Pre-1996 County 
Log(real male weekly earnings) 0.0887 0.217 0.341** 0.395** 0.0746 
(0.0859) (0.132) (0.172) (0.173) (0.241) 
Av. refusal rate of major residential projects ×
log(real male weekly earnings) 
0.293*** 0.267*** 0.228*** 0.263*** 0.326*** 
(0.0566) (0.0362) (0.0386) (0.0638) (0.0630) 
Share of developable land developed in 1990 ×
log(real male weekly earnings) 
0.295*** 0.217*** 0.236*** 0.236*** 0.216*** 
(0.0493) (0.0339) (0.0401) (0.0789) (0.0317) 
Range between highest and lowest altitude ×
log(real male weekly earnings) 
0.0951** 0.0580** 0.0846*** 0.0744* 0.0705** 
(0.0388) (0.0251) (0.0323) (0.0393) (0.0308) 
Geographical unit fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12355 5250 2485 1925 1610 
Number of geographical units 353 150 71 55 46 
Kleibergen-Paap F 11.75 64.90 44.66 26.90 31.87 
Critical values (10/15/20/25% max. IV size) 13.4/8.2/6.4/5.4 13.4/8.2/6.4/5.4 13.4/8.2/6.4/5.4 13.4/8.2/6.4/5.4 13.4/8.2/6.4/5.4 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold variables are endogenously determined. Instruments include: Change in 
delay rate b/w 1994-1996 and 2004-2006, share votes for Labour in 1983 and population density in 1911. All supply constraints measures are standardised to 
their standard deviation at LPA level. The coefficients can be interpreted as an increase in the house price-earnings elasticity due to a one standard deviation 
increase (based on the LPA-sample) in one of the constraint measures. Observations are clustered by pre-1996 counties in Column (1) and by the alternative 
geographical units considered in the other columns.  
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Table 5 
Baseline Specification but Using Labour Demand Shock as Demand Shifter 
PANEL A – TSLS: Second stage 
Dependent variable: Log(real house price index) 
(1) (2) 
Geographical unit: Local Planning Authority Travel to Work Area 
Log(labour demand shock) * 0.306** 
(0.122) 
0.244** 
(0.118) 
Av. refusal rate of major residential projects 
×  labour demand shock
0.656*** 
(0.123) 
0.758*** 
(0.148) 
Share of developable land developed in 1990 
×  labour demand shock
0.916*** 
(0.107) 
0.804*** 
(0.0851) 
Range between highest and lowest altitude ×
×  labour demand shock
0.331*** 
(0.108) 
0.103 
(0.0624) 
Geographical unit (LPA or TTWA) FEs Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 12355 5250 
Number of geographical units 353 150 
Kleibergen-Paap F 5.18 65.71 
Critical values (10/15/20/25% max. IV size) 13.43/8.18/6.40/5.45 13.43/8.18/6.40/5.45 
PANEL B – TSLS: First stage 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Refusal ×shock 
Developed ×  
shock 
Refusal ×  
shock 
Developed ×
shock 
Log(labour demand shock) 0.0388 0.0918 0.129* 0.0773* 
(0.0749) (0.0996) (0.0662) (0.0460) 
Change in delay rate b/w 1994-1996 and -0.135*** 0.0218 -0.134* 0.0209 
2004-2006 ×  log(labour demand shock) (0.0467) (0.0436) (0.0774) (0.0612) 
Share votes for Labour in 1983  -0.507*** 0.210*** -0.651*** 0.196*** 
×  log(labour demand shock) (0.106) (0.0511) (0.0561) (0.0493) 
Population density in 1911 (persons per km2)  -0.186*** 0.469*** 0.644*** 1.990*** 
×  log(labour demand shock) (0.0235) (0.0485) (0.107) (0.157) 
Range between highest and lowest altitude -0.0943 -0.418*** -0.0496 -0.140*** 
×  log(real male weekly earnings) (0.0681) (0.0866) (0.0455) (0.0271) 
LPA and year fixed effects (and constant) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared overall model 0.360 0.555 0.410 0.632 
R-squared within model 0.372 0.642 0.589 0.871 
R-squared between model 0.360 0.555 0.410 0.632 
Notes: * Labour demand shock is defined as the employment in each LPA that would have resulted given its industry 
composition in 1971, had employment in each industry developed in the same way as at the national level. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold variables are endogenously determined. All supply constraints 
measures are standardised. Observations are clustered by pre-1996 counties or by Travel to Work Areas. 
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Table 6 
Effect of Shifts in Earnings on House Prices in Average English LPA:  
Counterfactual Outcomes under Alternative Supply Constraint Assumptions 
PANEL A 
Counterfactual real house prices in average English LPA (in 2008 GBP) 
Baseline Estimates 
Variable 
Value in 
1974 
Value in 
2008 Std. Dev. Min Max 
Predicted 79184 225820 53265 57660 234176 
Predicted without planning 79184 146717 27881 58362 151757 
- and share developed set to zero 79184 123735 21204 56356 127898 
- and elevation range set to zero 79184 117128 19424 54005 121095 
- and independent effect of earnings removed 79184 112077 18106 52210 115844 
Predicted with refusal rate lowered by one std. dev. 79184 195234 43220 57966 202289 
- and share developed lowered by one std. dev. 79184 168568 34676 58277 174512 
- and elevation range lowered by one std. dev. 79184 160784 32236 58378 166408 
- and independent effect of earnings removed 79184 153850 30089 58472 159192 
PANEL B 
Counterfactual real house prices in average English LPA (in 2008 GBP) 
Lowest Bound Estimates 
Variable 
Value in 
1974 
Value in 
2008 Std. Dev. Min Max 
Predicted 79184 225820 53265 57660 234176 
Predicted without planning 79184 177378 37448 58184 183678 
- and share developed set to zero 79184 155026 30450 58451 160446 
- and elevation range set to zero 79184 148765 28548 58492 153991 
- and independent effect of earnings removed 79184 134690 24348 57466 139342 
Predicted with refusal rate lowered by one std. dev. 79184 208148 47436 57831 215749 
- and share developed lowered by one std. dev. 79184 185331 40019 58076 191971 
- and elevation range lowered by one std. dev. 79184 178864 37945 58151 185234 
- and independent effect of earnings removed 79184 161941 32597 58362 167613 
PANEL C 
Counterfactual real house prices in average English LPA (in 2008 GBP) 
Lower Upper Bound Estimates 
Variable 
Value in 
1974 
Value in 
2008 Std. Dev. Min Max 
Predicted 79184 225820 53265 57660 234176 
Predicted without planning 79184 136995 24977 57653 141643 
- and share developed set to zero 79184 113157 18366 52621 116907 
- and elevation range set to zero 79184 106100 16628 50055 109644 
- and independent effect of earnings removed 79184 103826 16092 49230 107281 
Predicted with refusal rate lowered by one std. dev. 79184 190768 41773 58015 197635 
- and share developed lowered by one std. dev. 79184 161785 32548 58364 167450 
- and elevation range lowered by one std. dev. 79184 153054 29845 58483 158363 
- and independent effect of earnings removed 79184 149773 28841 58529 154949 
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Table 7 
Effect of Labour Demand Shock on House Prices in Average English LPA and TTWA: 
Counterfactual Outcomes under Alternative Supply Constraint Assumptions 
PANEL A 
Counterfactual real house prices in average English LPA (in 2008 GBP) 
Baseline Estimates 
Variable 
Value in 
1974 
Value in 
2008 Std. Dev. Min Max 
Predicted 79184 225820 53265 57660 234176 
Predicted without planning 79184 189313 40616 58850 195996 
- and share developed set to zero 79184 175235 35446 59517 180996 
- and elevation range set to zero 79184 169989 33605 59798 175522 
- and independent effect of earnings removed 79184 166127 32242 60011 171464 
Predicted with refusal rate lowered by one std. dev. 79184 214979 49437 58101 222738 
- and share developed lowered by one std. dev. 79184 200696 44345 58723 207683 
- and elevation range lowered by one std. dev. 79184 195779 42584 58950 202504 
- and independent effect of earnings removed 79184 191331 40989 59160 197822 
PANEL B 
Counterfactual real house prices in average English TTWA (in 2008 GBP) 
Baseline Estimates 
Variable 
Value in 
1974 
Value in 
2008 Std. Dev. Min Max 
Predicted 77438 222520 52325 56634 230499 
Predicted without planning 77438 186155 39460 57998 192167 
- and share developed set to zero 77438 177478 36179 58541 182826 
- and elevation range set to zero 77438 175432 35430 58669 180650 
- and independent effect of earnings removed 77438 172557 34391 58842 177601 
Predicted with refusal rate lowered by one std. dev. 77438 222520 52325 56634 230499 
- and share developed lowered by one std. dev. 77438 211391 48289 57154 218631 
- and elevation range lowered by one std. dev. 77438 200193 44195 57712 206709 
- and independent effect of earnings removed 77438 198807 43687 57784 205235 
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FIGURES 
Fig. 1  
Relationship between Change in Refusal Rate and 
Change in Planning Delay Rate 
Fig. 2 
Year Fixed Effects:  
Impact of Unobserved Characteristics at Aggregate Level 
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Fig. 3 
Impact of Removing Supply Constraints on House Prices in Average English LPA: 
Baseline Estimate (TSLS)
Fig. 4 
Impact of Reducing Supply Constraints on House Prices 
in Average English LPA: Baseline Estimate (TSLS)      
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Fig. 5 
Regulatory Restrictiveness and House Prices: Northeast vs. Southeast, 
+/- one Standard Deviation and 10th vs. 90th Percentile 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Detailed Description of Data and Sources 
This appendix provides details on the various sources and computation of variables used in 
our empirical analysis. 
Real house price index 
We obtained the house price data from the Council of Mortgage Lenders (CML) (1974 to 
1995) and from the Land Registry (1995 to 2008).28 For the purpose of our analysis we need 
to construct a house price index. We do so by taking account of the composition of sales in 
terms of housing types by adopting a mix-adjustment approach (see e.g., Wall, 1998). 
Essentially, this index holds constant the share of each housing type, analogous to consumer 
price indices that measure the cost of a fixed basket of goods and services. Housing types 
distinguished in the CML data (1974 to 1995) are ‘bungalow’, ‘detached house’, ‘semi-
detached house’, ‘terraced house’, ‘flat / maisonette in converted house’, ‘purpose-built flat or 
maisonette’ and ‘other’. The type ‘other’ has been discarded in these data, leaving six 
different types. In the registry data (1995 to 2008), four housing types are distinguished: 
‘detached’, ‘semi-detached’, ‘flat / maisonette’ and ‘terraced’. 
For the CML and the Land Registry data separately, we first determined LPA-specific 
weights by averaging the share of sales of each type over the period of observation: 1974 to 
1995 for the CML data and 1995 to 2008 for the Land Registry data. These weights were 
subsequently used for computing weighted average house prices, by multiplying weights with 
mean house prices for each type and summing over all types. Weighted prices from the CML 
data were divided by weighted prices in 1974 and weighted prices from the Land Registry 
data were divided by weighted prices in 1995. A continuous index for the period between 
1974 and 2008 was then created by first setting the Land Registry index to 1 for 1995 and 
then multiply it with the CML index value for 1995. The real price index was obtained by 
deflating the nominal series with a Retail Price Index for all items excluding mortgage interest 
payments obtained from the Office of National Statistics (ONS)29, and by setting values for 
1974 to 100 in all LPAs.  
One issue encountered in this approach is that for some housing type×LPA×year 
combinations, no transactions were observed so that we could not compute a mean price. This 
28 The CML data are derived from two successive surveys. The  Survey of Mortgage Lenders (SML) consists of 
house price data for the period from 1992 to 2004, while the Local Authority Mortgages Survey, 5% Sample 
Survey of Building Society Mortgages (SSBSM) consists of data from 1974 to 1991. In contrast to the Land 
Registry data, which contain all housing transactions in England, the SML and SSBSM are samples, in which the 
geographical scale is less fine; slightly more than 100 areas for most years. The CML data contain more housing 
characteristics, but for reasons of consistency, we construct a mix-adjusted index using information on the 
housing type only. The data are geographically matched in such a way that LPAs in the same CML-area have the 
same price index for the period from 1974 to 1995. (For the years with an overlap of CML and Land Registry 
data we prefer the latter as the much larger sample size ensures greater reliability.) 
29 The RPI for all items excluding mortgage interest payments was available only from 1978 onwards, so for the 
period 1974 – 1977 it was imputed with the general RPI. Note that deflation does not affect our estimation 
results, because of the period fixed effects.  
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occurred more frequently in the sparser CML data (9 percent of all housing type×LPA×year 
cells). Of these cases, 89 percent could be imputed with mean prices at the county level, 11 
percent were imputed with mean prices at the level of Government Office regions, and the 
remaining 5 cells had to be imputed with national averages. The potential bias due to 
imputation is limited, as empty cells are more likely to occur for types with a low weight: the 
average weight of missing cells was 0.02 and for cells in which the county mean was missing 
as well it was 0.01. So these imputations hardly affect the weighted average house price in an 
LPA. In the Land Registry data, less than 0.7 percent of cells were missing and the average 
weight was 0.05. All of these cases could be imputed with mean prices at the county level.  
Real weekly earnings of full-time working men 
We obtained data on total weekly gross earnings for full-time male workers at the workplace 
level from 1974 onward. Specifically, for the period between 1997 and 2008 we obtained 
LPA-level earnings data from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE)/New 
Earnings Survey (NES).30 For the period between 1974 and 1996 we obtained the earnings 
data at the county- and London borough level from the NES. We geographically matched this 
data to the LPA-level. For some LPAs there is a sizeable gap in earnings between 1996 and 
1997. These gaps are caused by the fact that the pre-1997 data is measured at the county (or 
borough) level, while the post-1996 data is measured at the LPA-level. The gap has been 
bridged by using county-level earnings information for 1997 and by using the growth rates 
from the county-level data to generate an imputed LPA-level time-series for earlier years.31  
A few LPAs in our panel have some gaps in earnings information (1.7 percent of all cells are 
missing). For missing observations at the tails of the time-series we use growth rates from the 
county-level/region-level earnings indices to impute the earnings figures. For all other gaps 
we use the ‘pattern’ of growth at the country/region-level. For a handful of cases the earnings 
trends at the LPA-level and the county-level go in different directions. Here we use alternative 
sensible imputation strategies. We carried out a number of robustness checks, which confirm 
that our findings are not sensitive to the particularities of the imputation strategy. In fact our 
findings are virtually unchanged if we do not impute the missing earnings figures at all. Real 
earnings, finally, are obtained by deflating the nominal series with the Retail Price Index.  
Planning induced supply constraints 
We obtained detailed information on the direct regulatory decisions (refusal rates and 
planning delays) for all English LPAs on an annual basis between 1979 and 2008 from the 
Planning Statistics Group at the Department for Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG). In compiling the panel data for the refusal and delay rates at LPA-level from 1979 
30 The ASHE was developed to replace the NES in 2004. This change included improvements to the coverage of 
employees, imputation for the item non-response and the weighting of earnings estimates. 
31 On the post-1996 sample, the correlation between the logarithm of earnings at the LPA and the county level is 
0.77. Regressing the logarithm of LPA-level earnings on the logarithm of county-level earnings and LPA and 
period fixed effects for the same sample, yields a coefficient of 0.96, with a standard error of 0.023. These 
figures indicate that LPA-level movements in earnings within each county tend to be rather similar. Reported 
standard errors are robust to this correlation as they are clustered at the county level. Note also that column (5) of 
Table 4 uses as the geographical unit the pre-1996 county, so these results do not rely on any imputation of 
earnings from the county to the LPA level, yet results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. 
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to 2008 (on an annual basis), we kept track of changes in LPA boundaries (mainly mergers) 
over time, matching all the data to 2001 LPA boundaries.32  
Physical constraints derived from land cover and elevation data 
Our share developed land measure is derived from the Land Cover Map of Great Britain 
(LCMGB). The first LCMGB was developed in 1990 as part of the long-running series of UK 
Countryside Surveys. The LCMGB provides data, derived from satellite images, allocating 
land to 25 cover types on a 25 metre grid. We obtained the 1990 LCMGB from the Centre for 
Ecology and Hydrology.  
In order to get an operational measure of the share developed land (i.e., the share of all 
developable land that is already developed) we categorised different land use classes into non-
developable land, developable yet undeveloped land and developed land, in a way similar to 
Hilber and Mayer (2009), Hilber (2010) or Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2013). Specifically, we 
classified the following land uses as ‘developed’: ‘suburban/rural developed’ and ‘urban 
development’. We classified as ‘non-developable’: ‘sea/estuary’, ‘inland water’, ‘costal bare 
ground’, ‘saltmarsh’, ‘ruderal weed’ and ‘felled forest’. We classified as ‘developable’: ‘grass 
heath’, ‘mown/grazed turf’, ‘meadow/verge/semi-natural swards’, ‘bracken’, ‘dense shrub 
heath’, ‘scrub/orchard’, ‘deciduous woodland’, ‘coniferous/evergreen woodland’, ‘tilled 
land’, ‘inland bare ground’ and ‘open shrub heath’. Finally, we classified as ‘semi-
developable’: ‘rough/marsh grass’, ‘moorland grass’, ‘open shrub moor’, ‘dense shrub moor’, 
‘upland bog’ and ‘lowland bog’. Semi-developable land was added as a separate category for 
the purpose of robustness checks. About one percent of all land cover in 1990 was 
unclassified. We have discarded this category from our computations. From these classes, we 
compute the share of developed land (either inclusive or exclusive of semi-developable land 
in the denominator of the formula) as an indicator for physical supply constraints.  
As a second set of measures for physical constraints we assembled elevation data for England 
by merging 525 separate elevation raster/grid files from the 1:50,000-scale Ordnance Survey 
Panorama Digital Elevation data. Each file provides a 20 kilometre by 20 kilometre tile which 
is equally divided by a 50 metre grid and the heights are represented as values at the 
intersections of this grid.  
Other instrumental and control variables 
We use the share of votes for the Labour party in the 1983, 1997 and 2005 General Elections 
at LPA-level as instruments to identify the local refusal rate (the latter two are used only in 
robustness checks). The source of the underlying Constituency level raw data is the British 
Election Studies Information System. We geographically matched the election results at 
Constituency level to the LPA-level using GIS. More specifically, we used the Constituency-
level boundaries for the relevant years to match the raw data to the 2001 LPA-level 
boundaries. As instrument for the share developed land we use historical population density 
32 Observations on National Park Authorities (NPAs) have been discarded. Observations on Urban Development 
Corporations (UDCs) have been added to LPA observations if their boundaries were confined within a single 
LPA, and they were discarded if they dealt with developments in multiple LPAs. The number of applications 
considered by UDCs and NPAs is typically small compared to the number of applications considered by LPAs. 
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for 1911, derived from the British Census. We geographically matched the available town-
level data from 1911 to 2001 LPA boundaries using GIS.33  
Aggregation to alternative geographical scales 
We aggregated our data from the LPA level to three alternative geographical housing market 
definitions (TTWAs, FURs and Pre-1996 counties) in the following way. Averages of LPA-
level house prices and earnings were weighted by the number of households in the 1991 
Census. Regulation data were created by first aggregating all applications, refusals and delays 
and then computing the relevant rates. Similarly, land cover and population data were first 
scaled to the different area definitions before computing the relevant rates. Elevation variables 
were weighted by area. Election outcomes were again weighted by the number of households 
in the 1991 Census. 
33 The town-level data were derived from the UK data archive. Latitude and longitude information was added using the OS 
Gazetteer. 
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Appendix B: Appendix Figures 
Fig. B1 
Average Refusal Rate – Major Residential 
Projects over 1979-2008 
Fig. B2 
 Share Developable Land Developed in 1990 
Fig. B3 
Elevation Range 
Note: Missing value for Council of the Isles of Scilly 
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Fig. B4 
Predicted Log of Real House Prices in Selected LPAs under Alternative Supply Constraints-Scenarios: Baseline Estimates 
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Appendix C: Construction of Labour Demand Shock Measure 
The 1971 UK Census of Population provides employment by industry for a 10% sample of 
residents in each Enumeration District, which we aggregated to 2001 LPA and TTWA 
geographies. Industries are classified into 7 broad categories on the basis of the 1 digit SIC of 
1968. The data neither distinguish a fulltime/part-time breakdown nor a male/female split, so 
this is all adult employment. Table C1 documents employment shares in column (1).  
Table C1 
Industry Composition of Employment, 1971 
Share of total employment in %, 
England 1971 
(1) (2) 
Industry Census of Population Employer Surveys 
Agriculture 2% 2% 
Mining 1% 3% 
Manufacturing 35% 43% 
Construction 7% 8% 
Utilities; Transport 8% 12% 
Distribution; Services 39% 24% 
National and Local Government Service; 
Defence 7% 
 
7% 
Total 100% 100% 
A national time series of employment growth by industry from 1971 to 2008 was obtained by 
combining two sources of information. For the period from 1971 until 1978, we used 
the Census of Employment – Employee Analysis, which disaggregates employment of male 
fulltime employees in England into 3 digits of SIC 1968. Table C1, column (2), shows the 
disaggregation of employment for 1971 using this source. Differences between columns (1) 
and (2) of Table C1 are attributable to the fact that unlike the Census of Population, the 
Census of Employment excludes women, part-time workers and the self-employed. For the 
period from 1978 until 2008, we use employment by all fulltime workers in the UK, 
disaggregated to broad industries (on the basis of 1 digit) of the 2007 SIC. The Office of 
National Statistics provides these data in the Workforce Jobs by Industry, drawing on 
employment and labour force surveys. Consistent with the 1971 Census of Population, this 
data includes the self-employed and women, but it excludes part-time workers. Moreover, 
unlike the other two sources it includes Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. While such 
inconsistencies could potentially reduce the strength of our instrument, they are mitigated by 
the fact that we only use growth rates of employment by industry, which can always be 
computed in an internally consistent way because the datasets have one overlapping year.  
A number of changes in industrial classification occurred between the 1968 and 2007 
classifications. The Office of National Statistics provides mappings between old and new 
industry classifications at a broad level. Furthermore, for each year in which the classification 
changed, we have employment in both the old and the new classification from the Census of 
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Employment – Employee Analysis. This allows us to back out the percentage of employment 
in each new industry class that came from different old industry classes. We use these weights 
to create a consistent time series of industry employment in the 1968 classification that can be 
matched to the LPA industry composition in the 1971 Census of Population.  
For two years (1978 and 1981), the Census of Employment – Employee Analysis was 
available in the industry classifications of both 1968 and 2007. This allows us to perform a 
rudimentary validation on the mapping.  Simulating SIC 1968 employment for both years 
from employment in the 2007 classification gave correlation coefficients of 0.96 and 0.97 
respectively, while the correlation coefficient of the change between these two years for the 
actual and simulated employment by industry data was 0.86.  
In order to create the labour demand shock, we produced indices of the resulting employment 
by industry series, where the 1971 level has been set to 1, as shown in Figure C1. For each 
LPA and industry, employment was multiplied with the corresponding index and the result 
was aggregated over industries. This yields the employment in each LPA that would have 
resulted given its industry composition in 1971, had employment in each industry developed 
in the same way as at the national level. Figure C1 highlights the significant rise of 
employment in Distribution and Services as well as in the public sector, set against the decline 
of mining and manufacturing. In view of the spatial pattern of employment in these industries, 
one would certainly expect these developments to leave their marks on local labour market 
dynamics – as confirmed in Panel B of Table 5.  
Fig. C1 
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Appendix D: Appendix Tables 
Table D1 
Baseline Results but with Additional Control: Distance to Centre of London  
(Charing Cross/Trafalgar Square) × Time-Trend (OLS and TSLS, 2nd Stage) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
TSLS: Second stage 
OLS 
All three 
instruments 
All but share 
Labour 
All but change in 
delay rate 
Log(real male weekly earnings) 0.258*** 0.112 0.183*** 0.0530 
(0.0456) (0.0831) (0.0619) (0.123) 
Refusal rate × 0.0300** 0.318*** 0.143* 0.442*** 
log(real male weekly earnings) (0.0138) (0.110) (0.0864) (0.166) 
Share developed in 1990 × 0.0752** 0.308*** 0.219*** 0.395*** 
log(real male weekly earnings) (0.0313) (0.0854) (0.0601) (0.116) 
Range in altitude × 0.0457* 0.0735** 0.0868*** 0.0781* 
log(real male weekly earnings) (0.0238) (0.0353) (0.0298) (0.0431) 
Distance to Trafalgar Square  × -1.68e-05*** 8.38e-06 -6.79e-06 1.92e-05 
linear time trend (4.84e-06) (1.31e-05) (9.76e-06) (1.93e-05) 
LPA and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12355 12355 12355 12355 
Number of LPAs 353 353 353 353 
R-squared overall model 0.498 
R-squared within model 0.958 
R-squared between model 0.0541 
Kleibergen-Paap F 4.55 5.97 2.50 
CVs (10/15/20/25% max. IV size) 13.4/8.2/6.4/5.4 7.0/4.6/3.9/3.6 7.0/4.6/3.9/3.6 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold variables are endogenously determined. 
All supply constraints measures are standardised. Observations are clustered by pre-1996 counties. 
Table D2 
Baseline Results but Only for LPAs outside Greater London Area 
– OLS and TSLS (2nd Stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
TSLS: Second stage 
OLS All three 
instruments 
All but share 
Labour 
All but change in 
delay rate 
Log(real male weekly  
earnings) 
0.219*** 0.112** 0.173*** 0.101* 
(0.0483) (0.0535) (0.0592) (0.0571) 
Refusal rate ×  log(real male weekly
earnings) 
0.0651*** 0.158*** 0.0996** 0.174*** 
(0.0154) (0.0337) (0.0405) (0.0371) 
Share developed in 1990 × log(real
male weekly earnings) 
-0.0270 -0.0142 -0.0364 0.00550 
(0.0210) (0.0404) (0.0387) (0.0438) 
Range in altitude ×
log(real male weekly earnings) 
-0.0231 -0.0191 -0.0267 -0.0122 
(0.0203) (0.0223) (0.0219) (0.0233) 
LPA and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11200 11200 11200 11200 
Number of LPAs 320 320 320 320 
R-squared overall model 0.463 
R-squared within model 0.963 
R-squared between model 0.163 
Kleibergen-Paap F 13.60 10.10 17.27 
CVs (10/15/20/25% max. IV size) 13.4/8.2/6.4/5.4 7.0/4.6/3.9/3.6 7.0/4.6/3.9/3.6 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold variables are endogenously determined. 
All supply constraints measures are standardised. Observations are clustered by pre-1996 counties. 
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Table D3 
Alternative Pre- and Post-Reform Time Windows 
PANEL A – Dependent: Log(real house price index) 
TSLS: Second stage 
(1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: 
Table 2 
Column (3) 
Use change in 
delay rate b/w 
79-01 & 03-08 
Use change in 
delay rate b/w 
96-01 & 03-08 
Log(real male weekly earnings) 0.200** 0.264*** 0.168** 
(0.0811) (0.0600) (0.0679) 
Refusal rate ×  log(real male weekly
earnings) 
0.164*** 0.0921** 0.200*** 
(0.0627) (0.0392) (0.0629) 
Share developed in 1990 × log(real male
weekly earnings) 
0.234*** 0.193*** 0.254*** 
(0.0437) (0.0265) (0.0351) 
Range in altitude ×
log(real male weekly earnings) 
0.0714** 0.0550* 0.0797*** 
(0.0322) (0.0284) (0.0298) 
LPA and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12355 12355 12355 
Number of LPAs 353 353 353 
Kleibergen-Paap F 10.70 21.40 11.58 
Critical Values (10/15/20/25% max. IV) 7.0/4.6/3.9/3.6 7.0/4.6/3.9/3.6 7.0/4.6/3.9/3.6 
PANEL B – TSLS: First stage for refusal ×  earnings
Log(real male weekly earnings) 0.926*** 0.879*** 0.913*** 
(0.310) (0.313) (0.337) 
Change in delay rate (alternative time 
windows as defined above) 
-0.241*** -0.301*** -0.236*** 
(0.0556) (0.0498) (0.0437) 
Population density in 1911 (persons per 
km2) ×  log(real male weekly earnings)
-0.250*** -0.268*** -0.248*** 
(0.0312) (0.0338) (0.0342) 
Range between highest and lowest 
altitude ×  log(real male weekly earnings)
0.0361 0.0464 0.0471 
(0.0616) (0.0618) (0.0617) 
LPA and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12355 12355 12355 
Number of LPAs 353 353 353 
R-squared overall model 0.106 0.132 0.103 
R-squared within model 0.205 0.229 0.203 
R-squared between model 0.106 0.132 0.103 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold variables are endogenously 
determined. All supply constraints measures are standardised. Observations are clustered by pre-1996 counties. 
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Table D4 
Alternative Instruments Using Labour Demand Shock 
as Demand Shifter at the Travel to Work Area level 
PANEL A – TSLS: Second stage 
Dependent variable: Log(real house price index) 
(1) (2) 
All instruments  
except share Labour 
All instruments except 
change in delay rate 
Log(labour demand shock) * 0.221 
(0.140) 
0.246** 
(0.117) 
Av. refusal rate of major residential projects 
×  labour demand shock
0.855*** 
(0.324) 
0.750*** 
(0.145) 
Share of developable land developed in 1990 
×  labour demand shock
0.805*** 
(0.0821) 
0.803*** 
(0.0856) 
Range between highest and lowest altitude ×
×  labour demand shock
0.115 
(0.0759) 
0.101 
(0.0620) 
Geographical unit (LPA or TTWA) FEs Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 5250 5250 
Number of geographical units 150 150 
Kleibergen-Paap F 6.281 97.25 
Critical values (10/15/20/25% max. IV size) 7.03/4.58/3.95/3.63 7.03/4.58/3.95/3.63 
PANEL B – TSLS: First stage 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Refusal ×shock 
Developed ×  
shock 
Refusal ×  
shock 
Developed ×
shock 
Log(labour demand shock) 0.156 0.0691 0.156** 0.0731* 
(0.0983) (0.0483) (0.0669) (0.0410) 
Change in delay rate b/w 1994-1996 and -0.365*** 0.0904* 
2004-2006 ×  log(labour demand shock) (0.103) (0.0540) 
Share votes for Labour in 1983  -0.683*** 0.201*** 
×  log(labour demand shock) (0.0555) (0.0449) 
Population density in 1911 (persons per km2) 0.0479 2.170*** 0.640*** 1.991*** 
×  log(labour demand shock) (0.212) (0.182) (0.108) (0.157) 
Range between highest and lowest altitude  -0.102 -0.124*** -0.0561 -0.139*** 
×  log(real male weekly earnings) (0.0728) (0.0354) (0.0456) (0.0260) 
LPA and year fixed effects (and constant) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared overall model 0.0896 0.560 0.398 0.635 
R-squared within model 0.246 0.842 0.579 0.871 
R-squared between model 0.0896 0.560 0.398 0.635 
Notes: * Labour demand shock is defined as the employment in each LPA that would have resulted given its industry 
composition in 1971, had employment in each industry developed in the same way as at the national level. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold variables are endogenously determined. All supply constraints 
measures are standardised. Observations are clustered by Travel to Work Areas. 
